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Abstract 
 
For the Western Balkan countries, the transition from socialism to capitalism and 
democracy was less smooth than in other parts of Emerging Europe. Once the war 
ended and peace returned, these countries did more than rebuild: they began a 
transformation into market economies, liberalizing prices, privatizing many state- 
and socially-owned enterprises, and building the institutions needed to support a 
market economy. Nevertheless, progress over the last two decades has been 
evident in every country, resulting in rising incomes and living standards.  
Perhaps the most tangible achievement of all lies in the fact that most of the 
Western Balkan countries are on a path towards European Union accession, 
something that seemed far off in the 1990s. It is incumbent upon us not to 
understate the serious challenges that lie ahead, both in terms of macroeconomic 
stability and even more so with regard to longer-term development. 
Yet, I remain confident that the region will rise to the challenge, as happened 
time and again in the past. Western Balkan countries understand that, without 
macroeconomic stability, there can be no hope of durable growth. 
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Introduction 
The countries of the Western Balkans have undergone a major economic 
transformation over the past 15 years, and many are unrecognizable compared 
with where they stood at the turn of the century. Following the conflict-ridden 
1990s, these countries set out to comprehensively rebuild and reform their 
economies. They opened up to global trade and became increasingly export-
oriented, expanded the role of the private sector, dismantled regulations that 
stifled business development, and began to build institutions needed to support a 
market system. Banking systems were built up—literally from scratch in some 
cases—with the aid of foreign capital and know-how. The result of these efforts 
has been robust economic growth, a significant rise in incomes and living 
standards, and enhanced macroeconomic stability.   
Growth in the post crisis period in the Western Balkan countries has been 
uninspired. The external environment has been weak, but it is the incomplete 
reform process that is holding back convergence to income levels of richer 
European Union economies. And faster growth, in itself, may not be enough. The 
Western Balkan countries also need to generate jobs to reverse the weak labor 
market outcomes that are leaving so many behind.1 
The fundamental problem of low productivity reflects years of under-investment, 
weak institutions and a difficult business environment. The private sector is the 
main contributor to economic output in all countries; nevertheless, the state 
retains a dominant role in key industries in several countries of the region, and a 
significant privatization agenda lies ahead. Small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) dominate the private sector and account for about two-thirds of value 
added on average.  
Narrowing the gap in living standards will require an intensification of reforms 
needed for building sustainable market economies. Weak institutions and the 
absence of appropriate incentives for high levels of long-term productivity are at 
the heart of this prosperity gap. Countries in the region are a long way from 
                                                          
1 Zuzana Murgasova, Nadeem Ilahi, Jacques Miniane, Alasdair Scott, Ivanna Vladkova-Hollar,  and an IMF Staff 
Team. 2015. The Regional Economic Issues (REI) The WESTERN BALKANS- 15 Years of Economic Transition. ISBN: 
978-1-49835-651-0 
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embracing a sustainable market economy, defined as one that is competitive, 
well-governed, green, inclusive, resilient and integrated. Comprehensive reforms 
are needed to promote a dynamic, vibrant private sector, backed by strong 
investment flows, both domestic and foreign. The state must play an important 
growth-enabling role by providing the rule of law, a stable macroeconomic 
environment and clear rules of the game for businesses.2 
1. Economic transformation in the Western Balkans 
 
In 1990s, mired in conflict, the Western Balkan countries have experienced a 
notable transformation over the last 15 years. They have transitioned toward 
market-based systems, privatized many inefficient state- and socially-owned 
enterprises, rapidly adopted modern banking systems, and enhanced the external 
orientation of their economies. The result has been a significant catch-up in living 
standards relative to their richer neighbors in advanced European Union 
economies. However, the pace of structural reform has been disappointing, owing 
to a combination of reform fatigue, difficult politics that have constrained reform 
efforts, and delayed membership in the European Union.3 As a result, the 
Western Balkan countries still lag well behind the New Member States of the 
European Union in terms of economic transformation and income levels, which 
are around one-third of those in Advanced EU economies. 
Economies have become increasingly export-oriented, with FYR Macedonia and 
Serbia experiencing particularly noticeable gains. And this has been accompanied 
by increasing diversification of their export markets, with greater trade within the 
region and with the New Member States, and, concomitantly, lesser reliance on 
exports to Advanced EU economies. And just as Western Balkan firms were 
discovering new markets, foreign direct investment (FDI) into the region also took 
off. 
                                                          
2 Sanfey P. & Milatovic J. 2018. EBRD. The Western Balkans in Transition: diagnosing the constraints on the path to 
a sustainable market economy 
3 Zuzana Murgasova, Nadeem Ilahi, Jacques Miniane, Alasdair Scott, Ivanna Vladkova-Hollar,  and an IMF Staff 
Team. 2015. The Regional Economic Issues (REI) The WESTERN BALKANS- 15 Years of Economic Transition. ISBN: 
978-1-49835-651-0 
7 
 
One sector that has been entirely transformed by foreign investment is banking, 
which has facilitated a more efficient allocation of capital. Starting in the early 
2000s, foreign investment into banking, combined with increased deposit bases, 
boosted private sector credit. 
Altogether, the region experienced significant gains in terms of incomes and living 
standards, although perhaps not as much as could have been expected. Still, 
income convergence of the Western Balkans cannot be seen as entirely 
satisfactory. In particular, the New Member States caught up with Advanced EU 
economies significantly faster at similar stages of transition, which raises the 
question why the Western Balkans did not advance at the same rate. 
1.1 Catching up with Advanced Europe 
 
In the years leading up to the global financial crisis, the increase in capital flowing 
into the Western Balkans was as significant as that into Central and Southeastern 
Europe. These capital inflows were intermediated by domestic banks, and the 
resulting extension of credit went beyond what fundamentals would have 
warranted. Indeed, according to some metrics, only half of the increase in credit-
to-GDP ratios in the Western Balkans could have been explained by economic 
fundamentals. 
Perhaps the biggest flaw in the Western Balkan economic model has been the 
chronic underutilization of human resources. In 2008, the unemployment rate in 
the region still averaged more than 20 percent. Employment levels tell an equally 
disappointing story, hovering between 40 and 45 percent on average since 2000, 
a full 10 percentage points lower than in the New Member States. 
Like elsewhere, boom times came to an end, imperiling income convergence. 
With the onset of the global financial crisis and the associated pull-back in global 
liquidity, capital flows reversed in the Western Balkans as they did elsewhere. As 
a consequence, credit growth slowed sharply, and current account deficits 
contracted by more than 10 percent of GDP on average. Growth simply slowed 
down in most Western Balkan countries. The problem is that seven years after the 
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onset of the crisis, growth remains lackluster in the region, and hence income 
convergence has stalled. At currently projected growth rates, Western Balkan 
economies will only close a small fraction of the gap with Advanced EU 
economies’ income per capita levels by 2030. And it is not just about incomes: 
faster growth is also needed to provide employment opportunities to the large 
surplus of unutilized labor in the region.4 
In some countries, the growth and jobs challenge is compounded by the need to 
pursue fiscal consolidation. As happened elsewhere in Europe, a substantial share 
of the rise in tax revenues during the boom years proved in hindsight to be 
cyclical, and this share disappeared once economic growth slowed or went into 
reverse. The boom had also prompted some countries in the region to lower tax 
rates. Once the crisis hit, Western Balkan countries found it hard to scale back 
spending to match the decline in revenues, not least because their share of 
recommitted spending is higher than in the New Member States or Advanced EU 
economies. As a result, some of the countries, notably Serbia and Croatia, now 
have very high public debt levels, exacerbated by ongoing fiscal deficits that need 
to be brought down.  
 
                                                          
4 Zuzana Murgasova, Nadeem Ilahi, Jacques Miniane, Alasdair Scott, Ivanna Vladkova-Hollar,  and an IMF Staff 
Team. 2015. The Regional Economic Issues (REI) The WESTERN BALKANS- 15 Years of Economic Transition. ISBN: 
978-1-49835-651-0 
9 
 
The (weighted) average annual growth rate of the Western Balkans region 
between 2001 and 2016 was 3.2 per cent, compared with 1.4 per cent in the EU. 
However, this period can be divided into two distinct phases: the pre-crisis period 
(2001-08) and the post-crisis period (2009-16). During the former, annual growth 
(weighted average) in the WB-6 was more than three percentage points higher 
than in the EU (5.3 versus 2.2 per cent). In the latter period, there were double 
dip recessions in 2009 and 2012 and average WB-6 growth in this period was just 
1.2 per cent, compared with 0.7 per cent in the EU. The speed of convergence has 
thus slowed down markedly over the past seven years.5 
Full convergence with average EU living standards could take many decades. A 
baseline scenario, which uses the average growth rates for the period of 2001-16, 
implies that the WB6 region, on average, could achieve the average GDP per 
capita in the EU in about 60 years time. An optimistic scenario, which uses pre-
crisis growth rates, would yield catch up with EU living standards in just under 40 
years, while a pessimistic scenario, which uses the postcrisis average growth 
rates, means that catching up takes place after 200 years (Chart 2). The speed of 
catch up would depend on the pace of addressing the challenges that hamper the 
region from developing its full potential.6  
 
                                                          
5 For further analysis see “How the Western Balkans can catch up” by Peter Sanfey, Jakov Milatovic and Ana Kresic, 
(EBRD Working Paper No. 185). 
6 Sanfey P. & Milatovic J. 2018. EBRD. The Western Balkans in Transition: diagnosing the constraints on the path to 
a sustainable market economy 
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Convergence on inflation has largely occurred. All Western Balkans economies are 
currently enjoying a high degree of price stability, with inflation rates similar to 
those of advanced EU countries. Low inflation in the eurozone and the fall in 
global commodity prices have been important contributors, but stable exchange 
rate regimes are also key pillars of this stability. A floating exchange rate is 
present in Albania and Serbia but excessive fluctuations are kept in check by 
central bank interventions. In the remaining Western Balkans countries the 
exchange rate is immovable in relation to the euro, either because the euro is the 
only legal tender due to unilateral adoption (Kosovo and Montenegro) or because 
the rate is fixed through a currency board (Bosnia and Herzegovina) or a long-
standing peg (FYR Macedonia). 
The key challenge facing the region going forward is to complete the structural 
transformation process that began two decades ago. The impressive reform 
process born out of the ashes of socialism had largely stalled by the mid-2000s 
and was left incomplete, a victim of reform fatigue, a difficult political economy, 
vested interests that had grown in power and sophistication, and disillusionment 
with the way some reforms were executed. The process of accession to EU 
membership—arguably the main catalyst of reforms in the New Member States—
remained a distant prospect for most of the Western Balkans. But abundant 
global liquidity gave the illusion, albeit temporarily, that fast economic growth 
was possible without reforming. Today, the region lags well behind the New 
Member States in terms of structural transformation. In some Western Balkan 
countries, resistance to private ownership has meant that many inefficient state- 
or socially-owned enterprises have survived and continue to impose a drag on 
public finances and resource allocation. Throughout the region, red tape and 
corruption continue to hamper economic activity, while corporate governance 
reform remains a long overdue promise. Importantly, wide political support for 
far-reaching reform—a crucial element in the transformation in the New Member 
States—has been elusive in most Western Balkans countries. There is a sense in 
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the Western Balkans that reforms have under delivered, and that the spoils of 
growth have benefited only a few.7 
1.2 Growth and Convergence 
 
All the Western Balkan countries enjoyed high and sustained economic growth 
starting at the turn of the century, in line with the rest of Emerging Europe. 
 
A simple growth-accounting exercise suggests that capital accumulation and total 
factor productivity gains were the biggest growth drivers in both the New 
Member States and the Western Balkans during the precrisis years. Indeed, both 
the Western Balkans and the New Member States experienced investment booms 
in the 2000s owing to substantial capital inflows and low global interest rates. The 
large productivity gains likely resulted from the transformation toward market 
economies, although the relatively small contribution of labor inputs and the 
consequent high importance of productivity—a residual—could be also partly 
explained by the large informal economies in the Western Balkan countries, 
which tend to be more labor-intensive.8 Nonetheless, similar patterns have been 
observed elsewhere—in particular, recent evidence suggests that the uptick in 
                                                          
7 Zuzana Murgasova, Nadeem Ilahi, Jacques Miniane, Alasdair Scott, Ivanna Vladkova-Hollar,  and an IMF Staff 
Team. 2015. The Regional Economic Issues (REI) The WESTERN BALKANS- 15 Years of Economic Transition. ISBN: 
978-1-49835-651-0 
8 Gerxhani, Klarita. 2004. “The Informal Sector in Developed and Less Developed Countries: A Literature Survey.” 
Public Choice 120: 267–300. 
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growth in emerging market economies during the 2000–12 period is mainly 
explained by higher total factor productivity. 9  In addition, the very low 
contribution of labor and human capital to GDP growth in the Western Balkans is 
in line with findings of other studies.10 11 12 
Yet despite a limited contribution from labor, the impulse to growth from other 
factors was strong enough to generate substantial improvements in living 
standards, as well as a reduction in poverty. By 2008, the Western Balkan 
countries had made impressive progress and reduced their gap in GDP per capita 
visà-vis Advanced EU economies by 30 percent. But contrary to predictions of 
standard economic theory, the speed of convergence was slower in the poorer 
Western Balkans than that of the richer New Member States during the boom 
years. 
Why did the Western Balkans converge more slowly? One possible explanation is 
that the closer physical distance of the New Member States to advanced EU 
economies may have offered advantages in terms of access to markets and 
investments, and facilitated the transfer of knowledge. These relative advantages 
are only recently partially offset by improvements in infrastructure links between 
the Western Balkans and Advanced EU economies. Yet even after controlling for 
the physical distance, econometric evidence suggests that, except for the postwar 
recovery period, the pace of convergence in the Western Balkans has been slower 
than in the New Member States. This is partly due to the absence of convergence 
within the Western Balkan region, because poorer countries such as Albania and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina failed to grow significantly faster than the richer 
countries, such as Croatia.    
                                                          
9 Tsounta, Evridiki. 2014. “Slowdown in Emerging Markets: Sign of a Bumpy Road Ahead?” Working Paper No. 
14/2015, International Monetary Fund, Washington. 
10 Campos, Nauro F., and Fabrizio Coricelli. 2002. “Growth in Transition: What We Know, What We Don’t, and 
What We Should.” Journal of Economic Literature 11: 783–836. 
11 International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2009. “What’s the Damage? Medium-Term Output Dynamics after Financial 
Crises.” World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund, Washington, October. 
12 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 2013. Transition Report. London: European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development. 
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 What other factors may have constrained faster convergence? There is a growing 
literature on the impact of structural factors on convergence, though mostly on 
larger panels of countries. Findings suggest that domestic financial development 
speeds up convergence13,14 and that human capital is more important to growth 
for countries that are less developed (Fung 2009); (Ciccone and Papaioannou 
2009)15. Better institutional infrastructure and selected labor market reforms 
have been shown to facilitate convergence at the regional level16. Reform 
priorities for sustaining convergence have been found to vary with income levels. 
Empirical evidence suggests that in lower-middle-income countries, priorities 
should be reforming banking and agricultural sectors, reducing barriers to FDI, 
increasing competition in product markets for a more vibrant services sector, 
improving the quality of secondary and tertiary education, and alleviating 
infrastructure bottlenecks. In upper-middle-income countries, boosting 
productivity growth would require deepening capital markets, developing more 
competitive and flexible product and labor markets, fostering a more skilled labor 
force, and investing in research and development and new technologies17. Finally, 
a survey of various studies that focus specifically on the transition process 
concludes that institutional quality and market liberalization policies to promote 
private sector growth have a positive impact on economic growth, despite their 
initially disruptive effect18.    
 In line with these findings, the analysis here shows that improving the quality of 
governance, and developing market-oriented institutions, a strong human capital 
base, and deeper financial systems help poorer countries catch up. In contrast, 
                                                          
13 Aghion, Philippe, Peter Howitt, and David Mayer-Foulkes. 2005. “The Effect of Financial Development on 
Convergence: Theory and Evidence.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics (February): 173–222. 
14 Fung, Michael K. 2009. “Financial Development and Economic Growth: Convergence or Divergence?” Journal of 
International Money and Finance 28: 56–67. 
15 Ciccone, Antonio, and Elias Papaioannou. 2009. “Human Capital, the Structure of Production, and Growth.”  
Review of Economics and Statistics 91(1): 66–82 
16 Che, Natasha, and Antonio Spilimbergo. 2012. “Structural Reforms and Regional Convergence.” Working Paper 
No. 12/106, International Monetary Fund, Washington. 
17 Dabla-Norris, Era, Giang Ho, Kalpana Kochhar, Annette Kyobe, and Robert Tchaidze. 2013. “Anchoring Growth: 
The Importance of Productivity-Enhancing Reforms in Emerging Market and Developing Economies.” Staff 
Discussion Note 13/08, International Monetary Fund, Washington. 
18 Campos, Nauro F., and Fabrizio Coricelli. 2002. “Growth in Transition: What We Know, What We Don’t, and 
What We Should.” Journal of Economic Literature 11: 783–836. 
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the dominance of the public sector in the economy hinders the catching-up 
process. And the Western Balkans have lagged behind the New Member States in 
these areas. In light of the critical importance of economic transformation, the 
next section explores progress to date. 
1.3 Economic Structure 
 
Economies in the Western Balkans region tend to be diverse, rather than relying 
on one or a few sectors. Nevertheless, four sectors stand out as being of 
particular importance, namely: domestic trade, industry, public administration 
and agriculture. The Chart below shows the contribution of different sectors in 
each country to gross value added (GVA).19 Domestic trade, including transport 
and storage, accommodation and food services, is on average the largest sector of 
the Western Balkans economies, ranging from 18 per cent of GVA in Albania and 
Serbia to 27 per cent in Montenegro. While the wholesale and retail trade 
subsector accounts for about 15 per cent of the economies in the region, the 
importance of the accommodation and food services subsector in tourism-
dependent Montenegro, with a share of 8 per cent, is what distinguishes this 
country from the rest of the region.  Industry accounts for one-fifth of GVA on 
average. However, this varies significantly across countries. The role of industry is 
particularly important in Serbia, where it represents an equally important part of 
the economy as in the average EU-11 country. Manufacturing is the predominant 
industrial subsector, especially in Serbia, FYR Macedonia and Kosovo. Public 
administration is the third largest economic sector. The sector includes defense, 
education, social services and other public administration, and accounts for 17 
per cent of economic activity on average.  
This ranges from only 13 per cent in Albania to over one-fifth of the economy in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In general, the region is quite agriculture-intensive. 
Agriculture (together with forestry and fishing) accounts for 12 per cent of value 
added on average, ranging from 7 per cent in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 23 per 
                                                          
19 GVA is linked to gross domestic product (GDP) through the following relationship: GVA + taxes on products - 
subsidies on products = GDP. 
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cent in Albania. Agriculture plays a vital role in the Western Balkans, both socially 
and in terms of employment. This contrasts significantly with the EU-11 where on 
average the sector accounts for only 4 per cent of GVA. Serbia stands out as 
having a clear comparative advantage in farming, mainly due to fertile agricultural 
soil in its northern province of Vojvodina. Some large producers have been able to 
take advantage of both economies of scale and access to major export markets, 
primarily the European Union but also Russia, with which Serbia has a free trade 
agreement (the only country in the region in this position). The other five 
countries have less advanced agricultural sectors, mainly consisting of small-scale 
and inefficient subsistence farming. The potential for agribusiness to develop 
further in the region is significant provided countries can consolidate agricultural 
holdings, improve the quality of collection, storage and marketing, and develop 
agricultural support services such as insurance. 
 
 
SMEs dominate the economies of the Western Balkans. According to a recent 
OECD-led study, SMEs make up about 99 per cent of businesses in all countries of 
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the Western Balkans.20 On average, SMEs provide jobs for around three-quarters 
of the total number of employed, ranging from just below 70 per cent in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to more than 80 per cent in Albania. At the same time, on 
average, SMEs add an estimated two thirds of the countries’ total annual value 
added, a proportion similar to the EU average, ranging from just above 50 per 
cent in Serbia to just below 70 per cent in Albania. 
The EU is by far the region’s most important trading partner. Two-thirds of the 
region’s exports are with the EU. The share ranges from 80 per cent in FYR 
Macedonia to just 23 per cent in Kosovo. All countries have a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement with the EU, which gives the countries preferential access 
to EU markets for most goods. On average 20 per cent of Western Balkans 
exports go to neighboring countries. This figure covers a range from a 46 per cent 
share in Kosovo to a mere 9 per cent in Albania. Exports from the WB-6 countries 
grew by about 60 per cent on average over the past 10 years, and most of this 
growth was driven by the rise of exports to EU countries. One reason for this 
might be in the similarity of the Western Balkan countries’ main export products, 
although there are important differences among the six countries in terms of 
revealed comparative advantage.21 
1.4 Progress in Economic Transformation 
 
Structural reforms are an integral part of the process of transformation into a 
market economy. So how did the Western Balkans fare in their implementation? 
The sequence of reforms was similar to that in the New Member States. 
Specifically, price liberalization and reforms to trade and foreign exchange 
systems preceded privatization, and were followed only later by reforms to 
governance and competition policy. However, the pace of reforms was quite 
different, and the Western Balkans has not progressed as far as the New Member 
                                                          
20 SME Policy Index: Western Balkans and Turkey 2016, http://www.oecd.org/countries/albania/sme-policyindex-
western-balkans-and-turkey-2016-9789264254473-en.htm. 
21This issue is analyzed further in: “Firm performance and obstacles to doing business in the Western Balkans: 
evidence from the BEEPS” by Ana Kresic, Jakov Milatovic and Peter Sanfey (EBRD Working Paper No. 200). 
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States along a critical set of structural reforms. One notable feature of the early 
transition period was the unique economic system, known as “market socialism”, 
that was in place in the former Yugoslavia well before the 1990s, where heavy 
reliance on administrative controls coexisted with a vibrant private sector of small 
and medium enterprises without Soviet-style central planning (Boughton 2012). 
Albania, on the other hand, started the transition process as an isolated and 
autarkic state with virtually no elements of a market economy, but made swift 
progress, particularly in trade and foreign exchange liberalization, where reforms 
went further than in the rest of the Western Balkan states as early as 1992.  
 
 
Despite a difficult decade, by 1999 the Western Balkans as a group had reached a 
fairly advanced stage of transition (measured by a value of 3 or higher for the 
Transition Indicators of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) 
in the areas of price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange, and small-scale 
privatization by 1999, trailing the New Member States by only a few years. 
However, other reforms, such as large-scale privatization, were delayed, and the 
Western Balkans are yet to reach the advanced stage of transition in governance 
and competition policy areas. A key culprit was another Yugoslavia-specific 
feature—the “socially-owned” system of enterprise ownership, in contrast to 
state ownership in centrally planned economies elsewhere— which posed 
important challenges to large-scale privatization. The absence of a legal property 
18 
 
owner required sorting out how to convert social to private ownership; the 
method of conversion varied across the different countries (Hashi 2001). The 
nature of the privatization process and the resulting stakeholder structure in 
those enterprises had implications for corporate governance and incentives to 
restructure: 
 The progress in large-scale privatizations was uneven across the region. 
While many Western Balkan countries had already initiated these 
privatizations in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Serbia, and Montenegro joined the process at later stages. There was also 
considerable variation across sectors: privatizations in the banking, 
telecommunications, and in some cases energy sectors generally moved 
ahead, but large public enterprises in historically important industries—
such as metals, shipyards, utilities, and railways—proved particularly 
difficult to privatize. Stalled privatizations often reflected large social 
opposition, high short-run costs, and few serious bidders. 
 Corporate governance and enterprise restructuring of former state-owned 
enterprises remained a challenge across the region and state support often 
continued. For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina the management of 
privatized enterprises was hampered by diffuse or ill-defined ownership 
rights.  
In FYR Macedonia, most socially-owned enterprises were sold to insiders 
rather than to strategic investors with capital and know-how, and many 
firms thus survived with substandard performance. Progress in winding 
down a few large loss-making enterprises has been slow. In Serbia, weak 
governance and output price controls resulted in large enterprise at a 
significant financial cost. 
19 
 
 
 
The Western Balkans made substantial progress in reducing red tape and 
improving the business environment in the mid-2000s. Steps were taken across 
the region to lighten the regulatory burden. Several countries initiated 
“regulatory guillotines” to eliminate unnecessary regulations, set up one stop-
shops for starting a business and obtaining construction permits, reduced non-tax 
fees, strengthened bankruptcy procedures, improved investor protection, 
introduced or expanded the coverage of real estate cadastres, introduced or 
improved investment promotion laws, and set up entrepreneurial zones with 
good infrastructure and land free of ownership uncertainty. Large infrastructure 
projects were initiated to fill critical gaps. According to the World Bank’s Doing 
Business Indicators, significant progress across the region was made on some 
fronts: registering property is cheaper in the Western Balkans than in the 
Advanced EU countries, and the tax burden is lighter. Yet it is still time-consuming 
for businesses to trade, pay taxes, or resolve insolvency, and costly to start a 
business or enforce contracts. Most countries in the region continue to face large 
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infrastructure needs in transportation as well as in energy. Overall, rigid business 
environments often continue to hamper foreign investment, though there are 
isolated success stories. 
A formidable challenge facing the region is reforming governance. While better 
governance facilitates higher per capita incomes, empirical evidence does not 
point to a virtuous cycle whereby higher growth automatically brings about 
improvements in governance.22 This underscores the need for a concerted effort 
to improve the quality of governance. The Western Balkans still lag far behind the 
EU and New Member States peers in rule of law, control of corruption, and 
political stability, according to the World Bank’s World Governance indicators. 
Cross-country analysis shows that the quality of such institutions depends on 
several factors, particularly openness—that is, countries with greater openness to 
trade and finance tend to have better economic institutions.23 
1.5 Structural Reform Priorities for Faster Growth24 
 
It is generally accepted that ambitious structural reforms can boost economic 
growth. But which specific reforms would deliver the strongest growth dividend in 
each of the Western Balkan countries? This question is tackled here by first 
identifying country-specific reform gaps, and then comparing the performance of 
the Western Balkan economies along a wide set of competitiveness indicators 
with the performance of New Member States and the average EU country.25 
                                                          
22 Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Kraay. 2002. “Growth without Governance.” World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 2928. Washington: World Bank. 
23 The EBRD’s 2013 Transition Report notes that openness is a particularly powerful tool to improve institutional 
quality, as it is achievable across a wide range of political systems. The report posits that international integration 
may help institutions through several channels. The increased presence of international firms helps to disseminate 
international business practices and standards. It may also put pressure on national and local authorities to 
improve the quality of government services. Dual listing of company shares may contribute to improved corporate 
governance. 
24 Kosovo could not be included in the empirical analysis of reform priorities in the Western Balkans given data 
constraints. 
25 The analysis is based on data from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report. 
Competitiveness is defined as the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity 
of a country. The database covers 144 countries, including six of the seven Western Balkan countries under 
consideration. Data for Kosovo are not available. 
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Growth regressions are then used to rank reforms according to their importance 
for growth. The results allow for proposing country-specific reform priorities in 
areas where both the competitiveness gap is large and the estimated growth 
impact of reform is high.  
In the IMF report 26  there are aggregated set of factors that determine 
productivity and growth, encompassing 10 broad areas such as institutions, 
infrastructure, and innovation, among others.27 Along a few dimensions the 
Western Balkan states have closed the distance with New Member states, but 
those most gaps are still negative. When assessed against EU averages, however, 
the pending reform agenda looms large. Where do the main gaps lie? 
 Relative to NMS, Montenegro and, to a lesser extent, FYR Macedonia 
compare relatively favorably: most of the estimated gaps are small, and a 
few are slightly positive—meaning that in these specific areas the 
competitiveness profile of these two countries is similar to that of NMS. 
The results for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia are more 
mixed—while the gap is relatively small in some areas, in other areas these 
countries lag behind significantly. For Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the notable gaps are in infrastructure and financial market development. 
Serbia generally faces more formidable structural challenges, as it 
compares unfavorably to NMS along all 10 indicators. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26Zuzana Murgasova, Nadeem Ilahi, Jacques Miniane, Alasdair Scott, Ivanna Vladkova-Hollar,  and an IMF Staff 
Team. 2015. The Regional Economic Issues (REI) The WESTERN BALKANS- 15 Years of Economic Transition. ISBN: 
978-1-49835-651-0 
27While the Global Competitiveness Report covers 12 reform areas (pillars), we omit two: Macroeconomic 
Environment and Market Size. The macroeconomic environment is analyzed in Chapter 3.  
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 Relative to the EU average, the gaps in all Western Balkan countries tend to 
be wider, highlighting significant structural reform needs in almost all 
areas. This is also true for Montenegro and FYR Macedonia, which compare 
reasonably well to the New Member States. Overall, the major gaps 
throughout the region are in institutions, infrastructure, goods market 
efficiency, and financial market development. The estimated gaps in 
business sophistication and innovation are particularly large compared to 
the EU, both relative to other reform areas and in contrast to generally 
good performance of the region along this dimension relative to New 
Member State peers. 
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If all structural reforms were equally important for growth, the size of the reform 
gap would signal reform priorities. However, the growth impact of reform areas 
differs. Results suggest that the growth impact of reforms varies with income 
levels— institutions and infrastructure are estimated to be relatively more 
important for lower- and middle-income countries, whereas innovation and 
business sophistication appear relatively more important for high-income 
countries.   
Leaning on these findings by combining reform gaps and the relative importance 
of each reform area for growth, we can identify reform priorities. According to my 
methodology, the reform priority is higher the more important the specific reform 
area is for growth and the larger the corresponding reform gap is. This derived 
structural reform map serves to provide an indicative overview of where reform 
priorities may be.28 
The results suggest that, compared to New Member States, reforms across the 
Western Balkans are particularly needed in the areas of institutions, 
infrastructure, goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, and financial 
market development. Each of those areas is found to be among the top five 
reform priorities for at least four of the six Western Balkan states; infrastructure 
was identified as a top reform priority in all six countries. 
When it comes to institutional reforms, the protection of property rights is a 
common problem in most of the Western Balkan countries, particularly relative to 
the EU average, though to a lesser extent in FYR Macedonia. 
In Serbia, and to a lesser extent in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and 
Montenegro, reform needs are large in areas linked to corporate sector 
performance. Specifically, this includes the strength of reporting standards, 
efficacy of corporate boards, and protection of minority shareholders.   
                                                          
28 The methodology is appealing in its simplicity and tractability, but with the caveat that the calculated impacts 
are only partial and not part of a fully elaborated equilibrium framework. While this approach does not make it 
possible to identify synergies between reform areas and does not say much about the timing of reforms, it is likely 
that improvements in institutions and parallel implementation of various reforms in other areas will lead to 
additional synergies. 
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Encouragingly, Albania and FYR Macedonia score relatively well in terms of 
burden of government regulation, even compared to the EU average. For Serbia, 
however, the gaps in this area remain large. 
The analysis of specific reform gaps within the broader infrastructure pillar 
suggests that the Western Balkan countries have had a mixed performance when 
assessed vis-à-vis their peers. In terms of overall quality of infrastructure, Croatia 
ranks better than its New Member State peers, while the largest overall quality 
gaps exist in Serbia. All Western Balkan countries, except Croatia, lag behind the 
EU by a wide margin.    
 The gap analysis points to important reform potential in railroad infrastructure in 
Albania, FYR Macedonia, and Serbia. Compared to the average EU country, road 
and air transport infrastructure gaps are large in all countries, though to a lesser 
extent in Croatia. 
The results of the analysis suggest that the Western Balkan countries impose a 
relatively low tax burden on businesses. Total tax rates29 are well below those of 
NMS and EU average in FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Similarly, all countries but Bosnia and Herzegovina perform well or 
are broadly at par in terms of procedures and time to start a business. 
Gaps in trade barriers, tariffs, and impediments to foreign ownership and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) are relatively moderate in most Western Balkan countries, 
but almost always negative. Rules on FDI and foreign ownership seem to be 
stricter in Croatia and Serbia.  
 Agricultural policy cost seems to be a significant burden for the economy in 
Croatia and Serbia, and to a lesser extent in Albania. 
 
 
                                                          
29As defined in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, the total tax rate is “a combination of 
profit tax (% of profits), labor tax and contribution (% of profits), and other taxes (% of profits).” 
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1.6 Unemployment rates 
 
In the Western Balkans, high rates of unemployment and low rates of 
employment predated the global financial crisis, pointing to deep structural 
problems. The New Member States— and particularly the Baltic’s— experienced 
large cyclical swings of both employment and unemployment during the 2000s, 
but in a qualitatively different context of markedly lower unemployment and 
higher employment. In contrast, workers in the Western Balkans failed to 
significantly benefit from employment gains during the boom years, while still 
registering significant job losses in the aftermath of the crisis (ILO 2012). 
The persistence of unemployment in the Western Balkans regardless of cyclical 
conditions is confirmed through econometric analysis of contemporaneous 
responses of the unemployment rate to changes in economic growth, which 
suggests that responses of labor market outcomes to swings in economic cycles 
are smaller and statistically insignificant. This is in sharp contrast with larger and 
statistically significant response coefficients found in most Central European and 
Baltic economies.30 Looking ahead, this implies that unemployment is likely to 
persist in the Western Balkans even as economic growth picks up and output gaps 
close in the post crisis period.31 
So why have labor market outcomes been so much worse in the Western Balkans 
than elsewhere? One reason is that the Western Balkan countries are latecomers 
to the transition process, and hence FDI stocks, diversification from traditional 
sectors, and private sector job creation are still lagging compared with New 
Member States. At the same time, the countries have experienced very large 
emigration and brain drain, resulting in high remittance inflows that likely raise 
                                                          
30 It is important to recognize that high (structural) unemployment could coexist with relatively flexible labor 
markets (IMF 2013). 
31 In the postcrisis environment, sluggish responsiveness of job creation to growth is likely aggravated by 
weakened balance sheets affecting financing conditions (ILO 2013). Also, job creation is impaired by a need for 
firms to build up new collateral to finance their activities (Calvo, Coricelli, and Ottonello 2012), while concurrently, 
fiscal consolidation could have depressed aggregate demand (ILO 2014). 
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reservation wages, hamper external competitiveness, and contribute to long 
unemployment duration.32 33 34 
While significant, skill gaps were not as binding in the Western Balkans as in the 
New Member States, which are more integrated into European supply chains and 
have a greater presence of large manufacturing firms. According to EBRD-World 
Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS), skilled 
labor shortages are considered a major or severe constraint by about one in five 
companies in the Western Balkan countries, just behind infrastructure and 
corruption. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence from employer associations and 
individual companies seems to suggest that in the Western Balkans, skill 
mismatches, which existed prior to the recent global economic slowdown, have 
become more prominent in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.  
 Strong employment and social protection systems were important features of 
centrally planned economies. 35  These labor markets were shaped by the 
particular legacy of the “self-management” system for enterprises, and the 
existence of so-called “social ownership”.36  This led to a high level of job 
protection for the “insiders” and to overall rigidity.37 
 Since the disintegration of the socialist economies, substantial labor market 
reforms have been undertaken, with the reform momentum having picked up 
since the middle of the 2000s, particularly in the areas of flexibility of wage 
determination and redundancy costs. Nonetheless, increased labor market 
                                                          
32 Kovtun, Dmitriy, Alexis Meyer Cirkel, Zuzana Murgasova, Dustin Smith, and Suchanan Tambunlertchai. 2014. 
“Challenges and Solutions for Fostering Job Creation in the Balkans.” In Jobs and Growth: Supporting the European 
Recovery. Washington: IMF. 
33 International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2013. “Faster, Higher, Stronger—Raising the Growth Potential of CESEE.” 
Regional Economic Issues October 2013—Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (Washington: IMF).  
34 Migration can also occur as a response to growth shocks, thus dampening their impact on unemployment. 
However, the remittance-reservation wage channel is likely to be dominant, because in contrast to the New 
Member States, most of the Western Balkans did not have easy formal access to labor markets in Advanced 
European economies for most of the sample period. 
35 See Kovtun and others (2014), World Bank (2008), and Gligorov and others (2008). 
36 Kuddo, Arvo. 2013. “South East Europe Six: A Comparative Analysis of Labor Regulations.” Technical Note 
(August). World Bank, Washington. 
37 These are particularly relevant to those with jobs in state-owned enterprises and the public sector in the form of 
strict rules for terminating employment and generous severance payments. 
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flexibility in the Western Balkan countries is a recent phenomenon that will likely 
take some time to manifest itself in improved labor market outcomes.   
 In addition, the region still ranks less favorably—relative to its more dynamic 
peers—in terms of a number of competitiveness indicators capturing labor 
market flexibility.  
As discussed above, cyclical, structural, and institutional considerations all play a 
role in determining poor labor market outcomes in Western Balkan countries, but 
their interplay is far from clear. 
 The Western Balkan countries are fairly similar in terms of the importance 
of demographic characteristics of individuals for determining labor market 
transitions. For instance, previously unemployed persons are more likely to 
remain unemployed, and higher levels of education are generally 
associated with better chances of finding employment. There are, however, 
a few notable differences. 38  Specifically, younger people seeking 
employment face significant headwinds in all countries, but have a 
somewhat better chance of finding a job in FYR Macedonia and Serbia.  
 Macroeconomic indicators have an important bearing on the dynamics of 
labor market transitions. Higher real GDP growth and more buoyant 
investment-to-GDP ratios are generally associated with better chances of 
finding a job, but in the absence of other reforms improvements in either 
indicator yield fairly limited results.39 Similarly, higher rates of private credit 
growth seem to encourage more people to seek employment, but the 
impact on the probability of employment is also rather muted. Fiscal 
stimulus (for example, higher general government fiscal deficits expressed 
as a percent of GDP) is associated with more people joining the labor force 
and with higher probabilities of finding employment, particularly if not 
associated with higher government-expenditure-to-GDP ratios, which offers 
                                                          
38 While cultural and religious factors may have a bearing on the variety of cross-country trends, these differences 
likely also reflect significant heterogeneity of labor market institutions observed across the region. 
39The marginal impact of a 1 percent increase in either indicator is only 0.01 on the probability of employment.  
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evidence in favor of a smaller role of the state in the economy.40 41 Finally, 
there is strong evidence that higher remittance inflows discourage people 
from seeking employment and are associated with longer unemployment 
spans.42 
 Stronger labor market institutions are critical for better outcomes. The 
analysis shows that a more decentralized wage bargaining processes, more 
flexible hiring-firing practices, and lower redundancy costs are all strongly 
associated with not only additional people joining the labor force but also 
with a greater probability of employment.43 Similar results hold for an 
environment with greater reliance on professional managers chosen based 
on merit and qualifications. In contrast, our analysis confirms that an 
environment where pay is only weakly related to worker productivity is 
more likely to discourage people from seeking employment. Finally, as one 
would expect, higher female participation in the labor force is found to 
moderately increase competition among the job seekers. 
 Broader structural reforms are also very important. The empirical evidence 
suggests that countries that are more advanced in overcoming the legacies 
of centrally planned economies and completing transition to a market-
based economy are also the ones that generate significantly higher chances 
for job seekers of finding employment. 
2. Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkan Countries 
 
Economic activity has been enhanced by growing regional cooperation in the 
Western Balkans. The increase in regional cooperation in the past decade, 
                                                          
40 One explanation for this finding could be that the fiscal impulse is picking up the statistical effect of a lower tax 
burden; higher fiscal deficits mean lower tax burdens for any given level of government expenditure. With low-tax 
countries shown to grow faster than high-tax countries (see Easterly and Rebelo 1993), this implies more 
employment opportunities for potential job seekers. 
41Loosening the fiscal stance by 1 percent of GDP would increase employment probability and reduce the 
probability of being inactive by about 0.025 and 0.035, respectively.  
42 The IMF analysis shows that 1 percent of GDP higher remittance inflows are associated with a 0.03 increase in 
probability of being inactive. 
43 A 25 position improvement in each of the corresponding Global Competitiveness Indicators is estimated to 
increase employment probability by about 0.05. 
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following the conflicts in the 1990s, has been one of the greatest recent 
achievements of the Western Balkans, and has brought with it two key benefits. 
First, it reduces tension and strengthens regional stability, allowing more 
attention to focus on common economic challenges and increasing the 
attractiveness of the region as an investment destination. And second, it brings 
various practical benefits that stem from higher levels of intra-regional flows of 
people, goods, services and capital, thus enhancing the competitiveness of 
relatively small economies.   A new format for high-level regional cooperation has 
been established. On 24 February 2014, the EBRD hosted at its Headquarters in 
London a Western Balkans Summit, which brought together, for the first time in 
such a format, the prime ministers of all six countries of the region, de facto 
launching a new format of regional cooperation: “Western Balkans Six at the level 
of Prime Ministers”. Besides promoting the Western Balkans as an investment 
destination, the summit contributed to the strengthening of regional stability and 
improving regional cooperation. In particular, it strongly promoted the need for 
better prioritization and coordination of major regional connectivity projects 
among the beneficiaries, as well as between the European Commission (EC), 
international financial institutions (IFIs) and bilateral donors, and the importance 
of inclusive partnership and the need to bring the EBRD and other IFIs on board at 
the earliest stage in the consideration and design of major regional projects.  
Extension of the Trans-European Network to the region was one of the major 
results of this regional cooperation and coordination. The efforts to advance a 
few major priority connectivity projects in transport and energy culminated in an 
agreement, reached at the high-level meeting between the EC and Western 
Balkans prime ministers in Brussels in April 2015, on the regional core transport 
and energy network for the Western Balkans as an extension to the region of the 
Trans-European Network (TEN-T). This ensures closer integration of the region 
with the EU and is the basis for leveraging investment in infrastructure. The EC 
announced an allocation of €1 billion over seven years for funding these priority 
projects. As part of the efforts to improve coordination in developing regional 
projects, all Western Balkans countries established National Investment 
Committees (usually headed by the prime ministers) and national coordinators, 
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tasked with preparing Single National Project Pipelines for priority investments, as 
a precondition for EU grants funding for transport investment. Soft connectivity is 
increasingly in focus. The Western Balkans Six process received the strongest 
political boost at the August 2014 Summit in Berlin, which paved the way for the 
Berlin Process. 44  The biennial Western Balkans Summits at the EBRD are 
complementary to the annual summits of the Berlin Process, while maintaining 
their initial strong focus on investment promotion. The third Western Balkans 
Summit at the EBRD, which was scheduled for 26 February 2018, continued the 
work on investment promotion and on promoting concrete regional projects in 
transport and energy to unlock key regional bottlenecks. But there is more to 
regional integration than physical infrastructure alone. The additional new theme 
of this EBRD summit is the “soft connectivity” agenda. A key element of the latter 
is the creation of a single investment space, which includes harmonizing 
legislation, removing nontariff barriers, improving both the depth and horizontal 
links of capital markets, strengthening the business environment in the region, 
and facilitating foreign investment. This is a contribution to developing the EU-
supported Regional Economic Area. An action plan for an EU-compliant regional 
economic area in the WB-6 is in place. One of the outcomes of the Western 
Balkans Summit in July 2017 in Trieste was the adoption of a “consolidated multi-
annual action plan for a regional economic area in the Western Balkans six.” The 
intention is to move the six countries beyond the existing free trade agreement 
and towards a more comprehensive economic cooperation. There are four 
components of the Regional Economic Area to be addressed by the action plan:  
(i) trade,  
(ii) investment,  
(iii) mobility and 
(iv) digital integration 
                                                          
44 The Berlin Process is a series of annual meetings of the six Western Balkans prime ministers and six EU states 
with a particular interest in the region, hosted by different EU countries, launched in August 2014 in Berlin, and 
serving to discuss important regional topics related to future EU membership of the region. The 2014 summit in 
Berlin was followed by Vienna in 2015, Paris in 2016 and Trieste in July 2017; the next, in July 2018, will be held in 
London. 
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 All six countries have committed to deepening their collaboration within the 
current regional free-trade agreement (CEFTA) to the point where goods, 
services, investments and skilled people can move freely within the region 
without tariffs, quotas or other unnecessary non-tariff, and other, barriers.  
Bilateral relations in the region have also advanced. The strengthened 
coordination between the WB-6 and the key international stakeholders has been 
accompanied by progress in the reconciliation and strengthening of good 
neighborly relations in the region. Highlights include, among others, the EU-
facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina aimed at the normalization of 
the relations between the two, and the rapprochement between Serbia and 
Albania.45 
3. How Competitive is the Western Balkans region relative to 
others? 
 
The notion of “competitiveness” can mean different things to different authors. A 
country is highly competitive if it has the right combination of institutions and 
policies, such as effective governance and an enabling business environment, and 
factors of production to achieve high levels of productivity. To understand why 
the region finds itself in its current state, and to assess the potential for catch-up, 
it is important to see where these countries stand across a range of indicators vis-
à-vis its comparators in the European Union.  How competitive are the Western 
Balkans countries? The natural starting point to answer this question is the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (GCR), a publication that bills 
itself as the “world’s most comprehensive assessment of national 
competitiveness”.46 But the GCR by no means captures all aspects of this concept. 
Other surveys and studies can complement the report by providing greater 
insights into specific aspects of the business environment and governance that 
hold back private sector development and deter investment. In this part of my 
                                                          
45 Sanfey P. & Milatovic J. 2018. EBRD. The Western Balkans in Transition: diagnosing the constraints on the path to 
a sustainable market economy 
46 See World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016, available at: 
http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/. 
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Dissertation I explain the competitiveness of three Balkan countries- Albania FYR 
Macedonia and Serbia relative to EU region. 
Table 1 shows the 2015-16 GCR global rankings for the three Western Balkan  
countries, along with three benchmark comparators: the European Union, the EU-
15 (the 15 member states prior to the 2004 expansion) and the EU-11 (the 11 
countries in central Europe, the Baltic states and south-eastern Europe that joined 
in 2004 or later).47  
 
 
Source: World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index Historical Database. 
 Note: WB refers to the Western Balkans, ALB to Albania, MKD to FYR Macedonia, and SRB to Serbia. 
The table shows the clear competitiveness gap between the Western Balkans 
region and the European Union. On average, the region is ranked 86th (ranging 
from FYR Macedonia in 60th to Serbia in 94th place), compared with an average 
50th place for the EU-11 and 36th for the European Union as a whole. The gap is 
particularly large with respect to the EU-15, where the average ranking is 23rd. 
The GCI is made up of three broad categories, which are divided into 12 pillars, 
and the rankings of the five Western Balkans countries by categories and pillars 
                                                          
47 The EU-15: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The EU-11: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 
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are also contained in Table 1. The rankings differ widely, both within and across 
countries. The region scores reasonably well on indicators associated with health 
and primary education, as well as higher education and training (except for on-
the-job training), electricity and telephone infrastructure and information and 
communications technology (ICT) use. However, the most problematic areas are: 
efficient use of talent, that is, capacity to attract talent from abroad and retain 
talent, as confirmed by the brain drain problem; and reliance on informal (family 
and friend) relationships rather than on professional management.  
The second area dragging down the overall ranking is business sophistication. 
Despite the high heterogeneity, on average countries lack well-developed 
business clusters and are characterized by shallow value chains. Transport 
infrastructure ranks badly mostly due to the limited passenger carrying capacity in 
airline traffic, but also because of the poor quality of overall infrastructure, 
including roads, railways and ports. On a more positive note, Table 2, which 
shows the 2007-08 GCR scores compared with the latest available (2015-16), 
suggests that there has been a gradual improvement in competitiveness since the 
pre-crisis years. In contrast, scores of the EU countries have remained on average 
almost the same as before. The biggest jump in competitiveness is in FYR 
Macedonia, where the score has improved by 0.6 points (on the GCR’s 1 to 7 
scale) and now lies just behind the EU-11 average. Notable advances have also 
occurred in Albania, but less so in Serbia. In an important sense, therefore, the 
Western Balkans economies are converging with EU comparators in terms of 
competitiveness. 
 
Source: Calculations based on the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index. 
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The GCR scores are a useful starting point for investors who wish to get a sense of 
how competitive a country is. However, other cross-country surveys and reports 
can provide complementary perspectives and insights, especially when it comes 
to economic governance and the overall quality of the business environment. To 
shed further light on these two areas, there are three other surveys and reports: 
two from the World Bank (Governance Indicators and Doing Business scores) and 
the joint EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS). 
As with the GCR scores, there is some distance to go for Western Balkans 
countries to match EU standards. But again, a look at the scores over time 
suggests that the gap is, on average, narrowing steadily. The biggest increase over 
the past 15 years has been in political stability, which is an indication of the 
region’s growing political maturity. However, due to a low starting point, on 
present trends it would take several decades before Western Balkans countries 
catch up with EU members in terms of governance. Still, this convergence is 
expected to speed up in the process of EU approximation.  
The World Bank’s annual Doing Business scores provide further insight into the 
obstacles faced by enterprises in the region.48 The latest rankings on overall ease 
of doing business vary widely, from 12th (FYR Macedonia) to 97th (Albania) out of 
189 countries. The width of this range exaggerates the differences among 
countries of the region. The rankings therefore need to be interpreted cautiously: 
few would argue that it is really easier to do business in FYR Macedonia than in 
Canada or Germany, for example, despite their relative positions in the overall 
scores. However, as with other indicators considered here, the sub-components 
and their trends over time can be more revealing. Common problems across the 
region include: dealing with construction permits (Albania ranks in last place 
globally on this measure49); getting electricity; and paying taxes, despite recent 
improvements in some cases. On the other hand, all countries made notable 
                                                          
48 The full scores are available at: www.doingbusiness.org. 
49 Albania’s overall ease of doing business ranking was downgraded by 35 places to 97th. This was almost entirely 
because the country’s position in the category relating to construction permits dropped, caused by the 
government’s decision to suspend the issuing of construction permits during the territorial reform process until 
urban plans are in place. 
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progress in ease of starting a business, registering property and trading across 
borders.  
To gain further insight into the obstacles, as perceived by businesses, we turn 
lastly to the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS). The BEEPS, carried out every three to four years since the first 
round in 1999, is a face-to face survey of top managers that looks at various 
aspects of the business environment through both quantitative and qualitative 
questions. One of the parts of the survey is an opinion-based question that asks 
respondents to grade areas according to their perception of how severe an 
obstacle is. The responses range from “not an obstacle”, which can be scored at 0, 
to “a very severe obstacle”, scored 4.  
Chart 3 highlights the main obstacles, ranked by severity, for a hypothetical 
“average” firm in each country. In virtually all countries, competition from the 
informal sector stands out as a key constraint. This is a long-standing problem in 
the region and efforts to address it have been sporadic at best. The Albanian 
government’s recent initiative to tackle the problem is welcome and may yield 
concrete results. Having reliable access to electricity is also identified by many 
businesses in Albania as a major obstacle, consistent with the analysis of the 
World Bank’s Doing Business report. 
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Source: EBRD-World Bank BEEPS V, 2013.  
Note: Estimated for a hypothetical "average" firm. Higher values correspond to a more severe obstacle to doing 
business. 
To conclude this section, it is fair to say that the Western Balkans region lies 
behind western European comparators in terms of competitiveness, governance 
and ease of doing business. But there are plenty of reasons to be optimistic about 
future trends. In particular, institutions and governance standards are being 
slowly but steadily improved, especially in the EU candidate countries. The next 
section outlines some of the potential advantages of the region not fully captured 
by the cross-country data sets mentioned above. 
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4. What can the Western Balkans offer investors? 
 
There are six features of the region that, are worth emphasizing. They are: 
prospective EU membership; macroeconomic stability; strategic location; diverse 
economies; Favourable taxses and low labor costs combined with a relatively 
educated population. Each of these will be discussed in turn.50 
4.1 Prospective EU membership 
 
The new European Commission Enlargement Strategy,51 released in November 
2015, has reaffirmed the European prospective of all Western Balkans countries, 
without exception. Although full membership is not on the cards for any of these 
countries during the mandate of the present Commission (2014-19), the past year 
has seen further progress in most countries in the enlargement process. The most 
advanced in this regard is Montenegro which, having started membership 
negotiations in June 2012, had by December 2015 opened more than half of the 
negotiation chapters of the EU acquis communautaire, including the most 
challenging Chapters 23 and 24 relating to judiciary and fundamental rights; and 
justice, freedom and security, respectively. Serbia opened its first chapters in 
December 2015, including the one on normalization of its relations with Kosovo, 
almost two years after the symbolic opening of the accession negotiations in 
January 2014. Albania, a candidate country since June 2014, is deemed in the 
latest European Commission report to be “making steady progress”. Only FYR 
Macedonia, a candidate since 2005, has failed to make demonstrable progress 
since then as its name dispute with Greece remains unresolved. The latest EC 
Enlargement Strategy has introduced a new methodology to assess the progress 
of aspirant countries. The report includes a five-point scale in a few pilot areas, 
including rule of law (functioning of the judiciary, fight against corruption and 
fight against organized crime), public administration reform, and key economic 
                                                          
50 Sanfey P., Milatovic J., Kresic A. 2016. EBRD. How the Western Balkans can catch up. . Working Paper No. 186 
51  Accessed at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_strategy_paper_en.pdf. 
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criteria (the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the European Union). These 
are: (1) Early stage; (2) Some level of preparation; (3) Moderately prepared; (4) 
Good level of preparation; and (5) Well advanced (see Table 3). 
 
Note: Scores are on a scale of 1 for early stage progress to 5 for well advanced 
None of the Western Balkans countries will become full EU members in the next 
five years. But the long-term prospect of membership comes with substantial 
funding mainly in the form of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) 
for supporting reforms. Table 4 shows per country financial allocation from IPA 
funds for the period 2014-20, covering reforms in areas such as democracy and 
governance, rule of law, environment, transport and energy, competitiveness, 
social policies and agriculture and rural development. As many benefits of the 
European Union for the region accrue before full membership is obtained, it is 
important, therefore, that the current momentum in the process is maintained or 
even enhanced in the years to come. 
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Source: EC, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/overview/index_en.htm 
Note: *2014-17. In addition, there is €2,959 million in funds for multi-beneficiary projects in the 
Western Balkans and Turkey. 
4.2 Macroeconomic stability 
 
For many years, countries in the Western Balkans region have enjoyed a high 
degree of macroeconomic stability. A stable economy anchors expectations and is 
a basic prerequisite for attracting the interest of foreign investors. Stable 
exchange rate regimes and low inflation rates are key pillars of the region’s 
macroeconomic stability. In four of the six countries the exchange rate is 
immovable vis-à-vis the euro, either because the euro is the only legal tender 
(Kosovo and Montenegro), or because the rate is fixed through a currency board 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina), or a long-standing peg (FYR Macedonia). Floating 
exchange rate regimes prevail in Albania and Serbia but excessive fluctuations are 
kept in check by central bank interventions; for instance, the Albanian lek has 
been at the rate of approximately 140 lek per euro for the last five years. As a 
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result, all countries have had very low inflation for many years (see Table 5), aside 
from Serbia where the rate had reached high single digit levels (or even briefly 
double-digit territory) but is now comparable to other Western Balkans countries, 
as well as being below the central bank’s target range. 
 
The figures on current account and fiscal deficits are less impressive (also shown 
in Table 5); average current account deficits in the region (as a per cent of GDP) 
were 9.9 per cent in the period 2009-14 while fiscal deficits were 3.8 per cent 
over the same period.  
In parallel, both public and private debt has increased significantly in most 
countries since 2007 (Chart 4). Serbia experienced the highest percentage-point-
increase in public debt; for private debt it was FYR Macedonia.  At the end of 2014 
public debt levels were well above 60 per cent of GDP (one of the Maastricht 
criteria for eurozone members) in Albania and Serbia. While this poses a risk to 
macroeconomic stability, strong mitigating factors are also in play. Albania and 
Serbia are both in formal programs with the IMF. The two countries have adhered 
closely to commitments made under their respective arrangements, which in both 
cases are explicitly designed to tackle fiscal imbalances and put public debt on a 
sustainable path.  
The level of private debt is particularly high in Montenegro, at more than 110 per 
cent of GDP, while still low in Albania and Kosovo. 
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Chart 4: Changes in levels of public and private debt as %   Chart 5: Relative over-indebtedness in 2014 
of GDP, 2007-14 
Interestingly, however, debt levels across all countries where the EBRD invests are 
still, on average, lower than those of other emerging markets with similar 
characteristics.52 This relative underleverage is driven both by lower levels of 
household and corporate debt (see Chart 5). Therefore, this analysis suggests that 
in all Western Balkans countries there is room to increase household debt and 
also, in all countries except Montenegro, there is space for a corporate debt 
increase. Evidence suggests that domestic corporate credit has a greater positive 
impact on growth prospects compared with household debt or external corporate 
debt, and the countries that appear to have the greatest scope to increase 
domestic corporate debt are FYR Macedonia and Serbia. 
4.3 Strategic geographic location 
 
An important advantage for the Western Balkans region is its easy and free access 
to EU markets. This has been enabled by its geographic proximity to major 
                                                          
52 See the EBRD Transition Report, 2015-16: Rebalancing finance, Chapter 1, for an elaboration of this argument. 
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European markets and the free trade agreements that the countries of the region 
have signed with the European Union. The region is linked with the rest of Europe 
through the Pan-European corridors X (connecting the central Europe with Turkey 
through Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, FYR Macedonia and Greece), VII 
(connecting the Black Sea with the Ionian Sea and passing through Bulgaria, FYR 
Macedonia and Albania), and Vc (connecting central Europe with the Adriatic Sea 
via Hungary, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia again).  Owing to its 
geographic position between the East and West, the region is often referred to as 
a gateway to Europe. As sea shipping remains the cheapest way to transport 
goods from the Far East to Europe, China plans to establish a rapid transport 
connection from the Greek port of Piraeus, the first major European container 
port for ships entering the Mediterranean from the Suez Channel, through the 
Balkans further to the EU markets – the Balkan Silk Road. This will come as the 
part of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative unveiled by the Chinese President in 
2013. The Balkan Silk Road will be based on the existing railroad network linking 
central Europe with the Aegean Sea via Serbia, FYR Macedonia and Greece. The 
first operational move to realize the plan was made when the Chinese shipping 
giant Cosco Pacific took over half of the Piraeus port in a 35-year concession with 
the aim of turning the port into one of Europe’s top five container ports. 
However, to take full advantage of the port, investments into transport links 
across the Western Balkans are needed, such as the €1.5 billion worth high-speed 
railway between Belgrade and Budapest as signed between China, Hungary and 
Serbia.  Location is also a major factor why the Western Balkans could play a role 
in improving the EU’s energy security through possible investments in new gas 
pipelines. 
4.4 Diverse economies 
 
Economies in the Western Balkans region tend to be quite diverse, rather than 
relying on one or a few sectors, and therefore offer a wide range of opportunities 
for investors. A diverse economy is also one that allows human capital 
development to expand in many different directions. Chart 6 shows how the 
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economies of Albania, FYR Macedonia and Serbia are structured, that is, the 
contribution of different sectors in each country to gross value added (GVA), the 
measure of the value of goods and services produced in a country.53 The category 
“domestic trade, transport and storage, accommodation and food services” is on 
average the largest sector of the Western Balkans economies, ranging from 18 per 
cent of GVA in Albania and Serbia to 21 per cent in FYR Macedonia. 
                            Chart 6: Structure of economy, per cent of gross value added, 2014   
 
                                                                 Source: National statistical offices 
 Industry accounts for one-fifth of GVA on average. However, this varies 
significantly across the countries. The role of industry is particularly important in 
Serbia (where it represents an equally important part of the economy as in EU-
11). Manufacturing is the predominant industrial subsector, especially in Serbia 
and FYR Macedonia. Meanwhile public administration, defense, education and 
social services account for 17 per cent of economic activity on average, from 13 
per cent in Albania to 16 per cent of the economy in FYR Macedonia.  In general, 
the region is quite agriculture-intensive, and agriculture (together with forestry 
and fishing) accounts for 12 per cent of value added on average, ranging from 
only 9 per cent in Serbia to 23 per cent in Albania. Agriculture plays a vital role in 
the Western Balkans, both socially and in terms of employment. This contrasts 
                                                          
53GVA is linked to gross domestic product (GDP) through the following relationship: GVA + taxes on products - 
subsidies on products = GDP. 
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significantly with the EU-11 where on average the sector accounts for only 4 per 
cent of economies. Serbia stands out as having a clear comparative advantage in 
farming, mainly due to fertile agricultural soil in its northern province of 
Vojvodina. Some large producers have been able to take advantage of both 
economies of scale and access to major export markets, primarily the European 
Union but also Russia, with which Serbia has a free trade agreement (the only 
country in the region to do so). The other five countries have less advanced 
agricultural sectors, mainly consisting of small-scale and inefficient subsistence 
farming. The potential for agribusiness to develop further in the region is 
significant provided countries can consolidate agricultural holdings, improve the 
quality of collection, storage and marketing, and develop agricultural support 
services such as insurance.  Real-estate-related activities account for one-tenth of 
economies, on average, and construction around 7 per cent, on average, but 
more than 10 per cent in Albania. The financial sector, 
professional/scientific/technical sector and ICT each account for just 4 per cent of 
value added, on average. This is again in contrast with the EU-11, where these 
sectors account for a larger share, in particular the professional sector which is 
twice the size. These areas can be important attractors for future FDI.  
Furthermore, several countries have strong potential for further growth in the 
tourism sector. In 2013, receipts from international tourists amounted to 21 per 
cent of GDP in Montenegro and 13 per cent of GDP in Albania.54 Both countries, 
as well as others in the region, expect tourism numbers to increase significantly in 
the coming years, especially as the quality of infrastructure and services improves 
towards the standards of the most advanced western markets. 
4.5 Favorable taxes 
 
A stable and favorable tax climate and incentives for foreign businesses are 
sometimes deciding factors when foreign investors make decisions about location 
of investment. Most countries in the Western Balkans have made significant 
progress in reforming their tax systems in line with best international practice. 
                                                          
54 See World Bank, World Development Indicators, International tourism, receipts (current US dollars). 
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During the past decade, tax rates in the region have been relatively stable, there 
has been a fall in the administrative burden of submitting taxes and efforts have 
been made towards widening the tax base. To substantiate these points, various 
sources are pointed. First, the World Bank’s Doing Business report, together with 
PwC for this area, covers three dimensions of paying taxes: total tax rate with 
contributions of different types of taxes; number of tax payments per year; and 
time needed to comply with the tax rules.55 
Although there are differences among the countries in the Western Balkans 
region, the total tax burden is clearly lower than in any of the benchmarks (EU-11, 
EU, and EU-15). This is driven by both lower profit and a smaller labor tax burden. 
In fact, FYR Macedonia has one of the lowest total tax burdens in the world – 
largely because there are no labor taxes (that is, social insurance contributions 
borne by companies), but also because it levies taxes on corporate profits only 
once they are distributed as dividends and has low levels of other taxes.56 Albania 
and Serbia are the only two Western Balkans countries where the total tax share 
of profits is almost at the EU-11 level of 40 per cent.  
Chart 7: Paying taxes: number of taxes, 2015               Chart 8: Paying taxes: hours needed, 2015 
 
                                                          
55 As with other Doing Business sub-indices, the category “paying taxes” uses a case study scenario. This means 
that the same set of financial statements and assumptions about the company and transactions is used by a 
number of tax experts in each country to calculate what the company would have to do to satisfy tax procedures. 
Results are therefore comparable across the countries and give a richer picture than that obtained by simply 
looking at rates prescribed by laws. 
56Other taxes considered are property tax, vehicle tax, capital gains tax, financial transactions tax, environmental 
tax, etc. VAT is excluded from the calculation as it is not borne by the company itself.   
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Encouragingly, there have been positive changes over the years. A few countries 
have introduced online registration centers, with FYR Macedonia being the most 
advanced. Over the years FYR Macedonia has efficiently implemented a so-called 
“regulatory guillotine” project under which it drastically reduced regulatory 
burdens and red tape, and it is now the only country in the region with a 
successfully functioning one-stop shop for opening a business. Registering a 
business in this one-stop shop can be done in four hours57 and includes the 
allocation of a Tax Identification Number. Additional tax reforms were carried out 
over the last eight years, bringing down the number of tax payments per year 
from 43 in 2006 to only 7 from 2014 onwards. The most progress in simplifying 
tax payments was made by introducing electronic filing and payment systems in 
2008, and further improving and encouraging their use for corporate income and 
value added taxes in 2014. 
 
4.6 Low labor costs with a relatively educated population 
 
A further advantage of the region is the relatively low cost of labor, as shown by 
unit labor costs (ULC), defined as gross labor cost divided by GDP. While ULC is 
not a perfect approximation of representative firm labor costs, it gives a good 
idea of a country’s labor cost competitiveness. Chart 9 shows that all Western 
Balkans countries have lower ULCs compared with the EU average. This is 
important for export-oriented companies in the region because, Western Balkans 
exporters typically specialize in labor-intensive industries. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
57 Providing no additional licenses, approval or other specific documents are needed. Also, besides the general tax 
registration at the one-stop shop, under some conditions visiting the Public Revenue Office might be necessary 
(e.g. for foreign legal entities). 
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Chart 9: Unit labor costs, 2014 
 
The advantage of low labor costs is complemented by the relatively educated 
population. The Global Competitiveness Report discussed earlier confirms this 
point as the health and primary education pillar is among the highest ranked out 
of all 12 dimensions measured in the GCI. Basic statistics on education such as 
literacy rates, as well as educational attainment and current enrolment, are 
favorable. All countries record high adult literacy rates, scoring on average 98 per 
cent in 2011.58 The educational attainment structure of those older than 25 shows 
that almost three-quarters of the population has at least secondary education (EU 
average is 81 per cent).59 Current enrolment rates in primary and secondary 
school are comparable to EU levels in most of the countries, and all countries 
except Albania (Kosovo not included) had a lower share of early school leavers 
than the EU average in 2013, with a decreasing trend over the last three years.60 
                                                          
58  UNESCO: Education database, 2015 and ETF, 2015, Torino Process 2014: South Eastern Europe and Turkey. 
59 UNESCO: Education database, 2015. 
60 Early school leavers are defined as a share of 18-24 year olds with at most lower secondary education and not in 
further education or training. 
48 
 
Although the share of population with secondary education is on average higher 
in the Western Balkans than in the European Union, the quality might lag behind, 
as shown by the PISA exams,61 which test skills and knowledge of 15-year-old 
students. The share of those with tertiary education is about half that of the EU 
average. However, the structure of those currently enrolled in tertiary education 
is similar to EU countries (see Chart 10). Nonetheless, the share of science, 
technology, engineering and math (STEM) students in tertiary education, an 
important indicator capturing human capital crucial for adopting and creating 
technologies, is a bit lower on average than in EU countries. Still, this is not the 
case in Serbia, which has double the share of students in this category compared 
with the other Western Balkans countries, due partly to the importance of 
Belgrade as a regional university centre. Improving vocational education and 
training in line with private sector requirements is where more work can be done. 
This chimes with firm-level evidence from the BEEPS which points to difficulties in 
hiring people with adequate skill sets. However, on a more positive note, Western 
Balkans countries have made an effort to meet international standards by 
participating in the Torino process and the South East European Centre for 
Entrepreneurial Learning (SEECEL). As a result, countries in this region have 
adopted policy documents for medium- and long-term visions of their vocational 
education and training (VET) systems, with clear strategic objectives. They have 
also integrated entrepreneurship into VET curricula, thereby recognizing the 
importance of small and medium-sized enterprises in the region and their 
connection to VET. 
5. The Regional Competitiveness Initiative62 
 
Since 2000, the economies of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro and Serbia) have undertaken significant reforms to improve their 
business environments. These reforms led to the doubling of GDP per capita from 
                                                          
61PISA stands for the OECD’s Program for International Student Assessment.  
62 OECD. WESTERN BALKANS REGIONAL COMPETITIVENESS INITIATIVE   
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2000-2010 and a tenfold increase in inflows of foreign direct investment between 
2000 and 2008. The economies of the region also signed an ambitious trade 
agreement, CEFTA 2006, which has facilitated greater intra-regional investment 
and trade flows.  
However, the global economic crisis in 2009 threw most of the region into a 
recession. Faced with tightening public budgets and mounting social pressures, 
governments of the region realized that they could no longer rely on domestic 
consumption and credit expansion alone to generate growth and jobs.   
With increasing global competition, the region’s future lies in creating and 
exporting higher value products and services. Human capital and innovation lie at 
the heart of this new growth model for the Western Balkans. 
The Regional Competitiveness Initiative (RCI) aims to help Western Balkan 
economies unlock new sources of growth and competitiveness by tapping their 
innovation potential and developing the skills of their workforce.  
Financed by the EU and led by the OECD Investment Compact for South East 
Europe, the RCI partnered with governments over a three year period to test 
targeted innovation and human capital initiatives in their national contexts. Over 
2010-2013, each country selected and implemented an innovation related pilot 
project with the support of national and OECD experts. Projects included 
assessments of current country performance based on business surveys, study 
trips to learn about good practices in OECD member countries, and a detailed 
action plan. Regional working groups on innovation and human capital 
development supported peer learning and good practice by sharing knowledge 
gained through the pilot projects.  
The RCI project's impact, effective partnership with the region, and innovative 
approach was recognized by a first place award from the European Projects 
Association.63 
                                                          
63 In the category for concluded projects financed by the European Union’s Instrument for Pre-Accession. 
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In the next section I am going to analyze separately how the RCI project is 
implemented in three countries (Albania, FYR Macedonia and Serbia). 
 
5.1 ALBANIA: Launching a business plan competition 
 
Albania wanted to organize its first business plan competition with the support of 
the OECD. The purpose of the competition was to connect promising business 
ideas with sources of financing, inspire potential entrepreneurs and promote 
innovation in the private sector. 
The country’s main project actions are: 
 Published call for applications on the website of the Albanian Investment 
Development Agency. 
 Matched each application team with a voluntary mentor to help them 
develop their business plan. 
 Organized a workshop to train entrepreneurs on how to develop a 
successful business plan. 
 Selected the top 8 business plans for the final competition and held a 
workshop on how to create ‘elevator’ pitches for their business plan. 
 Held the final competition in Tirana on 8 November 2012, with a jury 
including representatives from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Energy, 
Albanian Investment Development Agency, the European Commission, an 
Albanian entrepreneur, and the OECD. 
Albania’s key achievements considering the initiative were that the country 
organized its first nation-wide business plan competition involving 18 teams of 
young entrepreneurs; the OECD supported the top three winners of the business 
plan competition with additional advisory services in the form of market research 
to help improve their products and services and the involvement of officials from 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Energy throughout the project also ensured 
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the transfer of know-how. As a result, a second and more ambitious business plan 
competition was planned for November 2013 in Tirana. 
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5.2 FYR MACEDONIA: Strengthening the national innovation system 
 
With the support of the OECD, the government of The Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia developed an innovation strategy and an action plan. 
However, there were some barriers to innovation, such as weak capacities of 
research institutions, low propensity to innovate in the business sector, poor 
framework for knowledge transfer and lack of co-ordination at the policy-making 
level. 
The key achievements of the country are: 
 FYR Macedonia carried out the first comprehensive assessment of its 
innovation system. 
 The assessment involved the contribution of over 500 businesses through 
surveys and focus groups. Based on the results of this assessment, FYR 
Macedonia developed and adopted its first Innovation Strategy and Action 
Plan. 
 A new Innovation Law was passed and the implementation of the Strategy, 
supported by a $20M loan from the World Bank, is being led by the Office 
of the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economic affairs. 
 The 20-member inter-ministerial team involved in the project gained 
valuable experience in the design of innovation policies. 
Some of the Project Recommendations considering the initiative are connected 
to: 
 Foster innovation in the private sector through information campaigns, 
events, competitions and awards  
 Adapt education policy to develop skills needed for innovation  
o Increase the quality of vocational training 
o Promote lifelong learning 
53 
 
 Create a regulatory environment that supports innovation  
o Provide an effective regulatory environment for academics and 
research institutions  
o Generate a competitive business environment through an effective 
competition policy 
 l Increase knowledge flows  
o Strengthen linkages with the Diaspora  
o Foster business networks and clusters 
5.3 SERBIA: Developing a competence technology center 
 
Serbia’s priority was to focus on the development of a competence technology 
centre in either the agri-food or biomedicine sectors. Such a centre aims to 
accelerate innovation and economic growth by facilitating interactions between 
industry, researcher and the public sector. 
Serbia’s project actions are focused on: 
 Reviewed practices of existing competence centers and technology 
institutes in OECD countries 
 Presented excellence and competence centers to Serbian officials during a 
study visit to Slovenia 
 Surveyed businesses and research institutions in the agrifood and biomed 
sectors 
 Consulted with experts in the agri-food and biomed sectors 
 Assessed the feasibility of a competence technology centre in Serbia. 
The country’s project recommendations are connected to orient centers toward 
firms and researchers in the agri-food or biomedicine sectors, establishing centers 
as autonomous, non-profit organizations linked to a university, expanding their 
scope of work in two phases (no modifications needed to sub-bullets), ensuring a 
stable source of funding and locate close to centers’ business/research users. 
Serbia’s key achievements considering RCI are: 
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 A feasibility study and an implementation plan were developed for the 
establishment of a competence technology centre in Serbia. 
 Over 300 members of the Serbian business and research community were 
consulted through a combination of surveys, focus groups and workshops. 
 The Ministry of Economy is using the results of the pilot project to support 
the biomedicine sector. 
 The project strengthened the capacity of public officials to design new 
innovation-support measures such as technology brokers and innovation 
vouchers. 
The Western Balkan economies suffer from a growing gap between the skills of its 
labor force and the needs of a fast-evolving market. Skilling up the workforce is 
critical if the region is to create higher value and more globally competitive 
products and services. 
To support the region in bridging the skills gap, the RCI created a Working Group 
on Human Capital comprising policymakers, business representatives and 
members of the research community. The Working Group came together 
between 2011-2012 to: Incorporate human capital building activities into the 
seven pilot projects, raise awareness of various methods and tools to measure 
skills gaps; e.g. the skills sector approach, foresight techniques, and skills gap 
measurement methodologies developed by CEDEFOP and O*Net, build policy 
maker capacity on how to conduct skills gap analyses and transfer good 
international practices. 
6. Obstacles and challenges to private sector development  
 
The private sector across the region is held back by numerous obstacles. Many 
previous studies and cross-country indicators have shown the various ways in 
which Western Balkans countries lag behind EU standards, whether in terms of 
overall competitiveness, weak institutions, low standards of governance or 
barriers to trading across borders, to take some of the most commonly cited 
problems. But which obstacles are the most severe, and are there important 
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differences across the six countries? The following analysis, based on background 
research papers, attempts to answer these questions.64  
Corporate productivity is adversely affected by a range of common obstacles in 
the region. An econometric analysis of total factor productivity (TFP) at the firm 
level in two countries – FYR Macedonia and Serbia – demonstrates a statistically 
significant impact of several variables on productivity.65 Most notably, corporate 
over-indebtedness is associated with lower productivity, as is a high degree of 
market concentration. The impact of these two factors seems to be higher in FYR 
Macedonia than in Serbia but is significant in the two countries. Another 
important finding is that enhancing the quality of the business and 
macroeconomic environment and improving the transport and 
telecommunications networks would be linked with significantly increased 
productivity of firms in Serbia. Similarly, companies in Serbia would benefit from 
higher youth inclusion, which is an important topic at the regional level given the 
high youth unemployment rates in all Western Balkans countries. Improving the 
quality of institutions in Serbia also implies a boost to corporate productivity, 
while in FYR Macedonia it would be accompanied with a decreasing public sector.  
There are also several country-specific corporate productivity drivers. In Serbia, 
higher productivity at the firm level is also associated with better corporate 
governance (as demonstrated by the finding that greater delegation of authority 
within a firm tends to increase firms’ productivity), while in FYR Macedonia 
productivity improvements could come from an increase in the quality of higher 
education and training. Although there is a widespread perception that SOEs in 
                                                          
64 This sections draws mainly on two background research papers: “Firm performance and obstacles to doing 
business in the Western Balkans: evidence from the BEEPS” by Ana Kresic, Jakov Milatovic and Peter Sanfey (EBRD 
Working Paper No. 200), and “Productivity drivers in the Western Balkans” by Sanja Borkovic, Peter Tabak and 
Emir Zildzovic (EBRD Working Paper – forthcoming). 
65 See Borkovic et al. who use firm-level data drawn from the BvD ORBIS database for the period 2007-15. The data 
are matched with firm-, sector- and country-level data covering a range of potential TFP determinants such as 
governance, infrastructure, access to finance and employment opportunities, among many others. The 
methodology underlying this analysis can be summarised as follows: first, a standard production function 
(assuming a Cobb-Douglas form) is estimated by regressing sales on labour, capital and intermediate inputs (all in 
logs). Under certain assumptions, TFP can be calculated straightforwardly as a residual, using the estimated 
coefficients on the three explanatory variables. Second, these TFP estimates can then be used (in difference form) 
as the dependent variable in a second-stage regression, where the explanatory variables now include a variety of 
firm-specific, macroeconomic, institutional and business environment variables. 
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the region are generally less productive than private companies, the econometric 
results confirm it only in the case of FYR Macedonia. 
Survey results also point to common problems across the region. The BEEPS 
includes questions about the subjective perceptions of business owners and 
senior managers about different potential problems, and as such it can be quite 
revealing about the actual situation on the ground. The survey approaches the 
issue in two ways: one method is to show respondents a card with 15 potential 
obstacles and ask them: Can you tell me which of the elements of the business 
environment included in the list, if any, currently represents the biggest obstacle 
faced by this establishment? Table 6 shows the results for the six Western Balkans 
countries. The second approach is to ask interviewees through the survey to rate 
the severity of each obstacle on a five-point scale, ranging from “no obstacle” up 
through “minor”, “moderate”, and “major” to “very severe”. These results, 
showing the percentage who say major or very severe, are in Table 7. 
Table 6: Biggest obstacle to doing business, percentage vote by country 
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Unfair competition from the informal sector stands out as the most serious 
perceived business obstacle in the region. More than 15 per cent of all firms cite it 
as the number one obstacle, and more than one-quarter deem it a major or very 
severe obstacle. Other prominent issues in the region include lack of access to 
finance, political instability, tax rates and tax administration, and problems with 
electricity supply. The problem of corruption also crops up prominently. Although 
few firms name it as the top obstacle, nearly 23 per cent of respondents say it is a 
major or very severe problem. 
Table 7: Obstacles to doing business, by percentage who perceive a major or very severe problem 
 
The estimated monetary costs of some of these obstacles are substantial. The 
combined losses from four obstacles whose impact is easily quantified – crime, 
corruption (that is, informal payments to “get things done”), power outages, and 
transport breakages and spillages – is estimated by BEEPS respondents at more 
than 13 per cent of total annual sales revenues. This is well above most countries 
in central Europe and the Baltic states (CEB). Considering that these four 
dimensions represent only a subset of the obstacles used in the BEEPS 
questionnaire, the level of the invisible tax on output/productivity due to an 
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inadequate business environment is doubtless even higher. Some obstacles are 
especially burdensome for small businesses. An econometric analysis of the 
revealed costs of business environment deficiencies in the Western Balkans 
region provides further insights.66 For example, unfair competition from the 
informal sector is a particular burden for smaller, local market- and service-
oriented businesses, and corruption especially detrimental to more innovative 
firms. The problems of high tax rates and lack of access to finance are more 
binding for firms in the manufacturing sector than in services. The econometric 
results also permit a more rigorous ranking of obstacles based on a “benchmark” 
company, taking into account the institutional setting of each country. However, 
the results are broadly similar to those based on unconditional means (cited 
earlier) and, once again, highlight the importance of tackling informality in the 
economy.  In general, the business environment for small businesses is 
particularly difficult.  
7. Transition qualities in the Western Balkans 
 
Western Balkans countries lag behind the EBRD regional average in terms of 
progress towards a sustainable market economy. During 2017, the EBRD 
undertook a major exercise to quantify and measure progress in transition across 
the six qualities of a sustainable market economy.67  The six qualities are: 
competitive, well-governed, green, inclusive, resilient and integrated. The scores 
for the Western Balkans countries are presented in Table 8, along with the 
average across all EBRD countries, as well as those for the EU-11. The results 
show most Western Balkans countries lagging behind in competitiveness and 
governance, in common with the rest of the EBRD region. But the gap between 
the Western Balkans and the overall EBRD region is fairly consistent across 
qualities, ranging from 0.3 to 0.5 points on the 1 – 10 scale. The difference in 
                                                          
66See Kresic et al. (2017).  
67 The full scores for all countries and the associated methodology are presented in the EBRD Transition Report 
2017-18, available online at: http://2017.tr-ebrd.com/. See also the annex to this paper for a summary of the 
qualities and the scores for all EBRD countries. 
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relation to EU countries in central and Eastern Europe is much more pronounced, 
with gaps ranging from 1.3 to 2.0 points. 
Table 8: Transition scores for six qualities of a sustainable market economy 
 
Serbia holds the leading role in most sections; however FYR Macedonia 
transitions scores are better in terms of competitiveness and governance. 
7.1 Competitive 
 
Western Balkans economies lack competitiveness, largely because of difficulties in 
the business environment. Countries in this region typically score poorly relative 
to EU countries on annual cross-country measures of competitiveness and the 
business environment such as the World Economic Forum’s perceptions-based 
Global Competitiveness Index and the World Bank’s Doing Business report. 
Enterprise surveys suggest that one of the biggest obstacles to doing business is 
unfair competition from the informal sector. Other significant obstacles include 
corruption, getting electricity and access to finance. Competitiveness is also 
hampered in some countries by a still-large state presence in key industries and 
inadequate implementation of the competition policy framework. 
Western Balkans countries score poorly on a broad cross-country measure of 
competitiveness. The latest scores from the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Index, a perceptions-based measure of the concept of 
competitiveness, show the clear gap between the Western Balkans region and the 
EU-11. On average, the region is ranked 80th (ranging from FYR Macedonia in 
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68th to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 103rd place), compared with an average 50th 
place for the EU-11. 
 
Table 9: Rankings in Global Competitiveness Index 2017-2018 for Albania, FYR Macedonia and Serbia 
 
Source: World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index Historical Database. 
 
Several components of competitiveness are especially problematic. The region 
scores reasonably well on indicators associated with the perceived quality of 
health and primary education, as well as higher education and training (except for 
on-the-job training) and technological readiness, such as information and 
communications technology (ICT) use. However, the most problematic areas in 
the GCI, apart from market size, are: (i) labor market efficiency related – namely, 
efficient use of talent (that is, capacity to attract talent from abroad and, even 
more importantly, to retain talent), as confirmed by the “brain drain” problem; 
and (ii) weak business sophistication, that is, the reliance on informal (family and 
friend) relationships rather than on professional management, the lack of well-
developed business clusters, and shallow value chains. The largest difference in 
ranking between the WB-6 and EU-11 is in the areas of macroeconomic 
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environment (particularly emphasizing the challenging fiscal situation in the 
region compared with the EU-11), market size, business sophistication, 
infrastructure development, innovation capacity and labor market efficiency.  
The overall assessment on innovation is pulled down by low scores on company 
spending on research and development (R&D) and the limited availability of 
scientists and engineers. For instance, data from UNESCO show that, in per capita 
terms, the overall spending on R&D in the region is just one-fifth of that in the EU-
11, and way below EU levels. Transport infrastructure ranks badly mostly due to 
the limited passenger-carrying capacity in airline traffic, but also because of the 
poor quality of overall infrastructure, including roads, railways and ports. 
Problems in the business environment are persistent. The World Bank’s annual 
Ease of Doing Business rankings vary widely in the region. FYR Macedonia is 
ranked 11th out of 190 countries in the 2018 report, the highest ranking in the 
region and the second highest among all EBRD countries of operations. Kosovo, 
Montenegro and Serbia are ranked between 40th and 43rd position, Albania is 
65th, while Bosnia and Herzegovina is ranked the lowest in the region at 86th 
position. However, the width of this ranking range exaggerates the differences 
among the six countries. Common problems across the region include: dealing 
with construction permits and getting electricity. 
Competition from the informal sector is perceived as the biggest obstacle facing 
businesses. As noted earlier, this finding emerges from the latest round of the 
EBRD/World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS).68 When asked to say which obstacle from a list of 15 represented the 
biggest problem for the establishment, more than 15 per cent of firm owners and 
managers (on average) cited informal competition as the main one. 69  The 
problem is seen as especially damaging in FYR Macedonia (chosen by 26 per cent 
of respondents as the top obstacle). More than one-quarter of firms in the region 
rate the problem as “major” or “very severe” (the two highest categories on a 
five-point scale). Informal competition affects smaller, locally oriented firms in 
                                                          
68For results from the individual countries, see: “How the Western Balkans can catch up” by Peter Sanfey, Jakov 
Milatovic and Ana Kresic, (EBRD Working Paper No. 185).  
69 Krešić et al. (2017). 
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particular. An econometric analysis linking the revealed cost of informality with 
observable characteristics shows that the smaller the company, the more likely it 
is to find informal competition to be a major problem.70 This is also the case for 
manufacturing (rather than service) companies and those with a local, rather than 
international, orientation. Perceived costs of informality are also higher for 
companies that have engaged in innovation in the previous three years. Access to 
finance is among the major obstacles to doing business, according to BEEPS. A 
quarter of all surveyed firms across the EBRD region described themselves as 
credit constrained, meaning that they need a loan but are either rejected when 
they apply for a bank loan or feel discouraged from applying. In the Western 
Balkans, the proportion of firms credit-constrained is significantly higher on 
average. The main driver behind the credit constraint was the discouraging level 
of interest rates at the time of the survey. Despite the high number of banks in 
the region, competition among lenders appears to be limited and SMEs in 
particular struggle to get the funds they need to grow their businesses. Other 
reasons that discourage firms from applying for bank credit include: complex 
procedures, collateral requirements and size of the loan. 
Entry and exit of firms are hampered by weak enforcement of competition 
policies. Competition laws and institutions are in place, but the authorities in the 
region face major challenges in building up sufficient capacity to respond to fast-
changing environments. According to the latest EC reports, the three candidate 
countries in the region (Albania, FYR Macedonia and Serbia) can be considered as 
“moderately prepared” in this area.71 The region faces medium to large transition 
gaps in SME development. According to the EBRD’s assessment of transition 
challenges, which captures the five dimensions of SME development, including: (i) 
bank financing, (ii) the legal framework for bank finance, (iii) non-bank financing, 
(iv) business skills and standards, as well as (v) the business environment 
disproportionately affecting SMEs, Albania is assessed to have large transition 
gaps, while the other countries medium transition gaps. Two particularly 
                                                          
70 Krešić et al. (2017). 
71 The 2016 European Commission reports on candidate and potential candidate countries available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/package_en. 
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problematic dimensions are: (i) non-bank financing, and (ii) business skills and 
standards.  
7.2 Well- governed  
 
Governance problems are pervasive throughout the region. The World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators show the largest distance between the 
Western Balkans and the EU member countries lies in the rule of law. The 
distance is also large in the areas of control of corruption, government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality. Evidence from the latest round of the 
EBRD/World Bank Life in Transition Survey highlights the prevalence of the belief 
in this region that political connections are key to success in life. With regard to 
corporate governance, the EBRD’s Office of the General Counsel’s assessment of 
corporate governance frameworks points to a number of deficiencies in Western 
Balkans countries that would need to be addressed in order to meet best practice 
in this area. 
All aspects of public governance lag behind EU standards. Using the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators as a benchmark, the most problematic areas in 
the Western Balkans are corruption, followed by the rule of law; government 
effectiveness and political stability. Voice and accountability and regulatory 
quality have the highest scores, but good marks for the latter may reflect 
implementation of the EU acquis, rather than genuine independence and capacity 
of the regulators. 
Governance scores have been improving. Although there is still some distance to 
go for the WB-6 to match EU governance standards, a look at the scores over time 
suggests that the gap is on average narrowing steadily (Chart 10). The biggest 
increase over the past 15 years has been in political stability, with notable 
improvements also in rule of law and government effectiveness. The smallest 
improvement in the scores has been in control of corruption.  Systemic corruption 
is a persistent problem. The latest EC progress reports assessed each WB-6 
country’s fight against corruption as being at “some level of preparation” (second 
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lowest point). The private sector also sees corruption as a major obstacle. In 
BEEPS V, 23 per cent of firms in the region deem corruption to be a major or very 
severe obstacle. The costs of corruption, measured by per cent of annual revenue 
paid as informal payment to “get things done”, are estimated at almost 1 per cent 
of annual sales.72 Also, all countries are ranked relatively low on Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).73 The WB-6 average CPI score 
is 40 (on a scale of 0 (worst) to 100 (best)), compared with an average of 65 in the 
EU (see Chart 11). 
Chart 10: Change in average score for governance   Chart 11: Corruption Perception Index Score 2016 
indicators 2000-15                                                               
 
Political connections are seen by many people as key to success in life. According 
to the third round of the EBRD/World Bank Life in Transition Survey (LiTS III), an 
average of more than one-third of people in the Western Balkans rate political 
connections as more important than either effort and hard work, or intelligence 
and skills, as the key to success in life.74 In this regard, the Western Balkans 
countries stand out among all EBRD sub-regions, highlighting the absence of 
meritocratic job selection and prevalence of clientelism and vested interests. 
                                                          
72 Krešić et al. (2017). 
73 The Transparency International corruption perceptions scores are available at: 
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview. 
74 EBRD (2016), Life in Transition: a decade of measuring transition, London, EBRD. 
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The corporate governance framework suffers from a number of weaknesses. The 
EBRD’s assessment of corporate governance legislation and practices in the region 
points to problems with stakeholders and institutions, structure and functioning 
of the board, internal control, and disclosure (particularly of non-financial 
information). In addition, environmental, health and safety, and social issues need 
to be integrated into corporate governance practices to align with good 
international practice.75 
7.3 Inclusive76  
 
Labor market reforms are needed to promote participation, address the skills 
deficit and boost job creation. All countries in the Western Balkans suffer from 
severe regional disparities, high levels of unemployment, especially among the 
youth, regular emigration flows and low levels of labor force participation. Ageing 
populations pose a significant challenge to long-term growth and the 
sustainability of social security systems.  
Employers in the Western Balkans face significant problems in acquiring 
employees with the required skills. In the BEEPS 2013-14 surveys, 34 per cent of 
firms in the Western Balkans reported that an inadequately educated workforce 
was an obstacle to current operations, with one-third of these firms deeming the 
problem to be major or very severe. More than half of all firms said that total 
annual sales would increase if this obstacle were removed. Although the sectoral 
composition of skills mismatch varies across countries, the needs are mostly 
concentrated in sectors within manufacturing and services, specifically hospitality 
and agribusiness (see Table 10). 
 
 
                                                          
75The EBRD corporate governance assessments, by country, are available at: http://www.ebrd.com/what-
wedo/sectors/legal-reform/corporate-governance/sector-assessment.html.  
76 This section is based on an internal EBRD note: “Skills mismatch in the Western Balkans” by A. Dincer, and on an 
EBRD-commissioned report: “School-to-Work transition in Western Balkans: Challenges and opportunities”, 
prepared by a team from Ernst and Young and the BLIC Policy and Management Institute 
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Table 10: Skills deficits in the Western Balkans 
 
Source: BEEPS 2013-14; Employer survey of National Employment Service in Serbia, Gishti and Shkreli 
(2015, Albania), Skill Needs Analyses (2014, Albania). 
Labor forces in the region lack both hard and soft skills, industry knowledge and 
practical experience. Due to the rapid development of technologies during the 
last decade, there is high demand for hard skills, in particular the mastering of 
new technologies. Additionally, surveys of the skill needs of employers, often 
undertaken by donor-funded programs, have identified important gaps in soft 
skills (communication, teamwork and collaborative problem solving) in Western 
Balkans countries.77 Vocational education and training (VET) institutions struggle 
to flexibly adapt education programs, teaching methods and infrastructure to 
changing needs. These factors impose limits on the quality provision of practical 
training and skills development through VET institutions.78  This is a critical 
shortcoming which can be eliminated only through practical training in 
enterprises. However, only a minority of businesses (41 per cent) in the Western 
Balkans address skills mismatch through formal training programs. Employers 
typically invest relatively little in on-the-job-training, and private sector 
involvement in skills policies remains limited.79  Young people have limited access 
                                                          
77Arandarenko, M., & Bartlett, W. (Eds.). (2012), “Labour market and skills in the Western Balkans”, 
FRENFoundation for the Advancement of Economics. 
78 The severity of skills-related issue goes beyond the acquisition of technical skills. According to the OECD’s PISA in 
2015, the majority of 15 year old students in Albania, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro do not possess 
basic mathematics skills (53, 70, 78 and 52 per cent, respectively, compared with 30 per cent at OECD). In Serbia, 
which participated in PISA 2012, 39 per cent of the 15 year old student population, compared with 26 per cent in 
the OECD, did not reach the basic level in mathematics. 
79 Arandarenko, M., & Bartlett, W. (Eds.). (2012). 
67 
 
to training and resources to establish their own businesses. Only 28 per cent of 
young people indicate that they have access to training to start and grow a 
business in the Western Balkans and only 22 per cent state that they have access 
to finance. 
Consequently, self-employment within the young labor force remains low at 11 
per cent for men and 7 per cent for women in the Western Balkans.80 
Skills-related challenges make growth less inclusive. The slow rate of job creation, 
even in times of economic growth, is a common feature of Western Balkans 
countries. For example, five years of consistent economic expansion between 
2004 and 2008 with an average annual growth rate of 5.8 per cent was 
accompanied by high rates of unemployment. More strikingly, during this period 
of economic boom the employment rate in Albania dropped from 52 to 46 per 
cent. As a result, youth unemployment rates in the Western Balkans remain very 
high81 and the private sector struggles to recruit skilled and motivated people. 
The resulting skills deficit is of particular concern, creating real operational 
challenges for companies such as high staff turnover and low productivity. 
Moreover, high levels of youth employment inhibit the process of human capital 
formation and increase the dependency on support systems, which puts an 
excessive burden on public finances in the form of higher social benefits. 
7.4 Integrated 
 
Improvements in regional connectivity are required to strengthen cross-border 
trade and investment links, and hence raise productivity. Current levels of trade 
and investment are well below potential and are held back by weak connectivity 
links. The region’s needs for improved transport and energy links are huge, but 
sources of finance are limited. A judicious use of EU grants, IFI and bilateral loans 
(including from China, as part of the “Belt and Road Initiative”), along with private 
                                                          
80 Notably, young women are 49 per cent less likely to have access to training and 67 per cent less likely to access 
to finance to start and grow business. 
81The percentages are: 29.2 per cent in Albania, 57.5 per cent in Bosnia Herzegovina, 49.5 per cent in Serbia, 55.3 
per cent, 39.5 percent in Montenegro and 50.8 percent in FYR Macedonia (World Development Indicators, 2014).  
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sector investment, could make the region more attractive to investors and exploit 
the region’s potential as an energy and logistics hub. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has lagged well behind levels in the EU. A visible 
impact of the global crisis was the sharp drop in FDI to the region, followed by a 
stagnating trend. While Serbia is the biggest recipient of FDI in aggregate terms, 
Montenegro received the biggest share of foreign capital in each of the last seven 
years in per capita terms. Still, the region lags significantly behind the European 
Union in terms of FDI stock per capita received; average FDI stock per capita in 
the Western Balkans is around €2,600 while in the European Union it is around 
€14,300 (Chart 12).82 Even compared with the EU-11 average, the Western 
Balkans region’s average FDI stock per capita is less than half that of the EU-11. 
However, over the past five years, Albania and Serbia have all experienced annual 
FDI inflows at a rate above the OECD average of 4.1 per cent of GDP, which is 
encouraging. 
Chart 12: FDI stock per capita (€) 
 
A more simple and reliable investment framework is needed to attract enhanced 
inflows of FDI. All Western Balkans countries legally observe a level playing field 
between foreign and domestic companies, but restrictions on foreign investments 
still remain. According to the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal Index of 
                                                          
82 UNCTAD’s International trade database, 2015 – see Sanfey et al. (2016). 
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Economic Freedom, which summarizes information on areas where countries 
formally limit foreign investments, on a scale of 0 to 100 (with 100 representing a 
perfectly free country) Western Balkans countries score 67.5 on average, while 
the EU scores 80.9. Additionally, problems often emerge not from the written 
laws but their implementation and enforcement, which are much more difficult to 
measure. International trade is below expectations, given the size, level of 
development and geographical location. In terms of trade openness, defined as 
the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP, the region lags behind central 
European and Baltic comparators, at 65 per cent of the EU-11 level (Chart 13). 
Exporters in the Western Balkans typically face bigger obstacles to doing business 
than those in comparator countries, including the poor quality of infrastructure. 
According to the World Bank’s Doing Business report, the main difference 
between the Western Balkans and the EU-11 (in the area of costs of trade) lies in 
the cost to export, with that of the Western Balkans countries more than double 
that in the EU-11. Time to export is also longer although the differences are less 
pronounced. Challenges for both domestic and cross-border connectivity arise 
from the poor quality of transport infrastructure. Years of neglect and under-
investment have left even major road and railway networks in a poor state. In the 
WEF’s GCI, the comparison with EU countries highlights the extent of the 
challenge facing the region (see Chart 14). An analysis of the sub-indices in the 
GCI suggests that the rankings are impaired by weaknesses of railroads in all 
countries, as well as by the poor quality of roads, limited air transport and 
inadequate (river) ports infrastructure in Serbia. 
Chart 13: Trade share (% of GDP, 5-year average)    Chart 14: Quality of infrastructure   
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Customs and trade regulations are a major problem for many exporters. The 
bureaucracy associated with exporting or importing is often onerous. The time 
and costs to trade are much higher compared with the EU-11 average. For 
instance, World Bank estimates place the average cost to export in the EU-11 at 
US$ 34 per unit compared with US$ 65 in Albania. At the same time, average time 
to export in EU-11 is five hours per unit, compared with six hours in Serbia. 
Although the overall severity of this obstacle in the BEEPS is ranked low, the 
results may be distorted by the large number of locally oriented firms which are 
not concerned with this issue. Those firms with an international orientation tend 
to rank the obstacle much higher as a problem for doing business.83 
The Western Balkans region is not well integrated into European supply chains. 
Results from an OECD study indicate that the Western Balkans is integrated 
mostly into the final stages of international supply chains in food, beverages and 
tobacco in addition to textiles and clothing, and mostly the intermediate stages of 
wood and cork, paper, printing and publishing, other non-metallic mineral 
products and fabricated metal products, as well as both first and intermediate 
stages of basic metals.84 The product mix within the Western Balkans countries 
also explains the limited integration to date into European supply chains. Over 50 
per cent of the region’s manufactured goods are classified as “labor and resource 
intensive” or “low-skill and tech intensive”, in comparison to about 30 per cent in 
the European Union. In contrast, only 18 per cent fall into the category “high-skill 
and tech-intensive goods” in comparison to 27 per cent in the EU-11. Poor logistic 
performance is another bottleneck of economic development. The World Bank’s 
Logistic Performance Index ranks 160 countries along six different dimensions of 
trade. Chart 15 illustrates the gaps in Western Balkans countries in comparison to 
the EU-11 regarding all sub-indices. The efficiency of customs and border 
management, the quality of trade and infrastructure and the ease of arranging 
competitively priced shipments (here averaged as an indicator for cross-border 
transport) are below the EBRD average of 2.7 in all Western Balkan countries. 
                                                          
83Krešić et al. (2017).  
84  See OECD (2013), “Trade in Intermediate Goods and International Supply Chains in CEFTA”, CEFTA Issues Paper 
6. 
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Chart 15: Logistic Performance Index 
 
Access to electricity remains a major barrier to business development. Similar to 
transport, the energy sector in the Western Balkans has been plagued for many 
years by under-investment, poor management and a non-commercial approach to 
operations, and the gaps in quality relative to EU countries are large. Access to 
electricity emerges from an econometric analysis of the BEEPS as one of the top 
three obstacles for a representative firm in the region. 85  Energy market 
integration has stalled, despite the fact that the countries’ infrastructure in the 
electricity sector is relatively well interconnected. Given the small size of national 
energy markets, the Western Balkans countries will not be able to develop liquid 
markets in isolation. Cross-border cooperation is therefore essential for achieving 
important cost savings for energy consumers through increased competition and 
more effective use of existing generation and transmission infrastructure in the 
region. However, with the exception of a common platform for coordinated 
allocation of electricity cross-border capacities, SEE CAO, there has been little 
progress in cross-border cooperation. For example, according to the Energy 
Community, with the exception of Serbia, the Western Balkans countries are yet 
to establish functioning power exchanges. Cross-border electricity trade is 
therefore below the region’s potential, reflecting the high level of market 
fragmentation.86 The lack of crossborder cooperation between the WB-6 and EU 
                                                          
85 Krešić et al. (2017). 
86 Energy Community Secretariat (February 2018) Knocking on the EU’s Door through the Energy Community: 
Integration of Western Balkans into the Pan-European Energy Market. 
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member states is also highlighted in the European Commission’s Enlargement 
Strategy 2025 for the region as a key barrier to expanding the EU’s Energy Union 
to the region. Chinese investment in the Western Balkans is growing in 
importance. China views the Western Balkans as an important component of its 
ambitious “Belt and Road” initiative. Major investments with Chinese sponsors 
have occurred or are under way in the transport and energy sectors in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. This funding, combined 
with a streamlined approval process and speedy implementation, is proving 
attractive to Western Balkans countries because the region’s major investment 
funding needs cannot be fully met by EU pre-accession grants and IFI lending.87 In 
April 2017, the China-CEE Institute became the first think-tank independently 
registered in Europe by a Chinese institution to produce research related to the 
“16+1” cooperation between China and central and south-eastern Europe and the 
Belt and Road initiative.   
8. Regional Economic Growth in the Western Balkans 
(Albania, FYR Macedonia and Serbia) 
 
GDP growth in the Western Balkans slowed from 3.1 percent in 2016 to an 
estimated 2.4 percent in 2017. Regional growth in 2017 is less optimistic than the 
2.6 percent expected when the Fall issue of this report88 was published. It slowed 
in Serbia due to a harsh winter and stalled in FYR Macedonia, where the political 
crisis deterred both public and private investment. The dynamism of the smaller 
economy of Albania drove regional growth in 2017, with support from higher 
growth in trading partners, a pickup in commodity prices, and the execution of 
large investment projects.  
                                                          
87  For further discussion, see O. Levitin, J. Milatovic and P. Sanfey, “China and South-Eastern Europe: 
Infrastructure, trade and investment links”, EBRD focus piece, 2016, available at: 
www.ebrd.com/documents/comms-and-bis/see-china-investments.pdf. 
 See also J. Bastian, “The potential for growth through Chinese infrastructure investments in Central and South-
Eastern Europe along the “Balkan Silk Road”, independent report prepared for the EBRD, 2017, available at: 
www.ebrd.com/documents/policy/thebalkan-silk-road.pdf. 
88Western Balkans Regular Economic Report No.13. Vulnerabilities Slow Growth, Spring 2018.  
73 
 
Although job growth was slower than in 2016, in the first nine months of 2017 
190,000 new jobs were created in the region. Labor force participation increased 
in most countries, as more people entered the labor market and found jobs. Over 
80 percent of new jobs were in services, mostly retail and wholesale trade, 
supported by growth in consumption. Although unemployment fell in most 
countries, it still ranges from 13.5 percent in Serbia to 30.4 percent in Kosovo. 
Poverty continued to fall despite rising food and energy prices.  
Even though revenues improved, not all countries took the opportunity to reduce 
fiscal deficits. Serbia recorded surpluses in 2017, but in the rest of the region, 
deficits continued, driven by the high amount of recurrent spending, often on 
poorly targeted social benefits and subsidies. Albania is now working to revive 
growth-enhancing capital investment. Careful financial, public investment and 
budgetary management will help ensure that fiscal risks associated with 
investments are minimized, which should relieve pressures on medium-term debt 
sustainability.  
External vulnerabilities intensified in some countries. Current account deficits 
widened in several countries despite growth in exports because, except in FYR 
Macedonia, imports overwhelmed exports. A particularly cold winter necessitated 
more energy imports, and large infrastructure projects and higher consumption 
demanded more machinery, equipment, and goods from abroad. A current 
account sustainability analysis suggests that Western Balkan countries need to 
reduce external deficits in the medium term. 
Bold structural reforms are necessary if the region is to grow sustainably over the 
medium term. Regional GDP growth is projected to rise from 2.4 percent in 2017 
to 3.2 percent. 
Because of weaker growth in FYR Macedonia and Serbia, real GDP growth in the 
Western Balkans slowed from 3.1 percent in 2016 to an estimated 2.4 percent in 
2017. In Serbia, where GDP growth was 1.9 percent in 2017, a severe winter and a 
summer drought subtracted at least 1 percentage point (pp) from growth because 
of lower agriculture and energy slow. In FYR Macedonia, a fall in investment 
subtracted 1.1 pp from growth.  
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Although the external environment remained favorable, in 2017 net exports 
contributed less to growth, overwhelmed by higher imports for energy projects, 
consumption, and investment. Western Balkan countries where base metal and 
mineral commodities constitute an important share of the export basket 
benefitted from the rise in global commodity prices. However, the combination of 
rising oil prices and energy imports necessitated by the harsh winter reduced the 
contribution of net exports to growth; though that contribution was positive in 
Albania (0.4 pp), net exports subtracted from growth in Serbia (-1.9 pp) and FYR 
Macedonia (-0.7 pp). As demand rose in the Euro Area, Albania and FYR 
Macedonia benefitted from rising commodity prices and higher tourism-related 
exports. 
In Serbia the moderately negative contribution of net exports to growth was due 
to higher imports of energy, intermediate, and capital goods. 
Consumption continued to make a major contribution to growth, supported by 
higher employment and increasing consumer credit. Consumption accounted for 
around 90 percent of output in the Western Balkans. In Albania, a sustained 
recovery in employment, wages, and household credit boosted private 
consumption, and public consumption was also positive as public wages rose. 
Private consumption grew, buoyed by rising employment, growing credit to 
households, and higher wages in Serbia and FYR Macedonia. Consumption growth 
stimulated job creation in wholesale and retail trade (services). While 
consumption is important at this level of development in the Western Balkans, 
because its growth is adding to the pressure on the external account from rising 
imports, it might stunt future growth. 
8.1  A positive, but clouded growth outlook 
 
In the medium term real GDP growth in the Western Balkans is projected to 
recover, reaching 3.2 percent in 2018 and 3.4 percent in 2019. A slight slowdown 
in Albania is being more than counteracted by faster growth in other countries in 
the region. FYR Macedonia’s economy is projected to gain momentum in 2018 
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and grow at 2.3 percent, from zero in 2017, as investment and consumption 
recover after resolution of the political crisis. In Serbia, a recovery in investment is 
projected to support growth of 3 percent in 2018 and 3.5 percent in 2019. On the 
other hand, growth in Albania is expected to moderate in during 2018–19 as large 
FDI projects wind down. 
The growth outlook assumes favorable external conditions: an investment-
supported economic recovery in the EU, higher growth in global trade flows, and 
favorable financing conditions with relatively low interest rates, even if there is 
further normalization of monetary policy in advanced economies. With a 
projected modest increase in prices, commodity exporters will get an additional 
growth boost, which should further build domestic demand. In general, growth 
relies on higher exports in Albania and FYR Macedonia and investment in FYR 
Macedonia and Serbia, tied to growth in the EU. While consumption is currently a 
major driver of growth throughout the region, its contribution is expected to 
strengthen even further in Albania and Serbia. As a result, risks could rise as 
growing demand for imports leads to higher external imbalances and subdues 
growth. Albania and Serbia will also rely on more public investment to support 
baseline growth, thus highlighting the importance of creating fiscal space for 
public investment, improving project management capacity, and exploring 
options for additional investment, such as PPPs. 
Externally, the expected recovery in EU growth is a major impetus for growth in 
the Western Balkans. But should the fears of trade wars gain ground, there could 
be a decline in confidence that would affect medium-term growth. EU growth is 
projected to remain strong in 2018 (though somewhat constrained by the 
unwinding of the monetary stimulus and below-target inflation), supported by 
higher investments and consumption driven by improved labor market 
conditions. Yet trade protectionism and rising geopolitical tensions could disrupt 
progress. Imports to the EU are projected to moderate in the medium term with a 
slowing in trade growth and domestic demand. The proposed U.S. introduction of 
tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum would have negative impacts, both direct 
and indirect, on the outlook for the Western Balkans. For instance, the EU exports 
about US$6 billion of steel to the U.S. While estimates suggest that the new tariffs 
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would depress U.S. demand for steel by not more than 10 percent, lower margins 
and volumes might have some impact on Western Balkan countries.  
Furthermore, both weather-related shocks and country-specific vulnerabilities—
such as low potential growth—could disrupt regional growth forecasts. Growth in 
2017 was damaged by Serbia’s weather vulnerability, which could rise even 
further with climate change. In addition, in the absence of productivity gains 
there is a risk that growth in the Western Balkan countries may slow down even if 
global growth trends up. Also, with interest rates low and financial markets 
volatile, the possibility of a sudden adjustment cannot be ruled out; inflation 
expectations are edging up as labor markets in developed countries tighten, and 
the U.S. dollar could appreciate as monetary easing is withdrawn in the EU, raising 
risk to countries with a high share of US$-denominated debt, like Serbia. 
Domestically, political uncertainty may cloud the growth outlook if upcoming 
elections in several countries lead to a slower pace of structural reforms. Notably, 
the risk of fiscal loosening is compounded by the increasing reliance on 
consumption: Serbia has announced yet another increase in public wages and 
pensions and high spending on pensions in FYR Macedonia leaves little for public 
investment. 
Downside risks to growth, challenges generated by fiscal consolidation, high rates 
of unemployment and inactivity, and exposure to natural disasters can only 
heighten vulnerability. Volatile domestic policy has previously affected growth in 
the Western Balkans. 
Risks to the growth outlook can be mitigated by increasing fiscal space for growth 
enhancing reforms and investments. The current fiscal consolidations in Albania 
and Serbia have reduced fiscal risks and improved confidence. However, more 
profound and long-lasting reforms are needed to ensure that policy reversals do 
not jeopardize growth and confidence outcomes. Tax reforms to mobilize 
revenues and create the fiscal space to fund development priorities should be 
accompanied by rationalization of spending. Fiscal rules, medium-term 
expenditure frameworks, and close monitoring of fiscal risks and contingent 
liabilities can foster institutional credibility and help restore fiscal space. Reforms 
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to support growth include broadening the tax base, eliminating loopholes and 
excessive tax exemptions, and reinforcing tax administration and collection. To be 
prepared for shocks, countries in the Western Balkans need fiscal space in which 
to maneuver; the space is currently tightly bound by untargeted recurrent 
spending. Rationalizing spending must be emphasized, especially as several 
countries in the region prepare for elections. Reforms could enhance the quality 
of public spending.  
But because the highest risk to the outlook is a low-growth trap, it is important to 
advance structural reforms to promote private sector development and reduce 
barriers to labor force participation. With high structural unemployment, low 
investment, low education outcomes that explains the inadequacy of human 
capital, and stagnating productivity growth, potential output in the Western 
Balkans is low. Investment rates are below the 25 percent of GDP recommended 
by the Growth Commission for sustainable long-term growth, even though 
countries with similar incomes have on average surpassed that.89 Real labor 
productivity has been low and stagnating. Political concerns—such as coalition 
politics and repeated election cycles, which intensify the political cycle, so that 
even dominant elites are risk-averse—have been slowing essential structural 
reforms, which are the only engine that can increase growth potential. The cost of 
inaction on reforms is enormous; an outsized public sector encourages capture of 
state assets and income streams. Finalizing this part of the transition from a 
planned to a market economy would lower fiscal pressures, reduce crowding out, 
and promote market competition. Policies to lift physical and human capital 
encourage labor force participation, and improved market institutions will help 
raise growth potential and reduce inequality.  
Low productivity, which is holding back the region’s growth potential, is a 
consequence of years of under-investment, inadequate institutions, and a difficult 
business environment. In all Western Balkan countries, the private sector is the 
main contributor to economic output; yet in several countries the state is still 
dominant in important industries, and the privatization agenda is still extensive. 
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Small and medium-sized enterprises dominate the private sector and account on 
average for about two-thirds of value added. An econometric analysis of barriers 
to productivity and growth highlights the importance of numerous factors and 
qualities. 90  For instance, extreme corporate indebtedness and market 
concentration are two variables that help explain poor productivity, as does the 
low level of youth inclusion. Complementary evidence comes from a major survey 
of firm owners and senior managers, which reveals the difficulties caused by 
competitors operating informally. Small businesses in particular find this obstacle, 
as well as corruption, highly problematic. Other constraints cited frequently were 
cumbersome tax administration, difficulties in accessing a reliable supply of 
electricity, and limited access to financing. 
9. Albania, FYR Macedonia and Serbia EU Accession: Is the 
2025 target date realistic?91 
 
Fifteen years after the Thessaloniki promise, most countries in the region are still 
stuck in the waiting room. FYR Macedonia has been a candidate since 2005 (but 
held back by a name dispute with Greece), Serbia since 2012 and Albania since 
2014. Membership talks have started for Serbia, and the European Commission 
recommended recently that talks should also start with Albania and FYR 
Macedonia. 
In 2014, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said that no 
country would join the EU during the current parliament. However, this was 
accompanied not long after by a greater attention by some bigger EU member 
states on the region, emphasized most clearly by the Berlin process. This was 
followed in 2018 by an ambitious new strategy for the region accounted by the 
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European Commission, which set a target date of accession of 2025 for Serbia92 
(with a note that others could also catch up).  
 
 
The approach of the European Commission, Germany and France in particular 
reflect the acknowledgement that a lot is at stake. Now, there are four reasons 
for the renewed focus on the Western Balkans: 
 First, the 2015 migration crisis drew attention to the importance of the 
Western Balkans for the EU in a security sense. From the perspective of 
governments in countries like Germany, such an inflow of people in such a 
short space of time, and the sense the national governments were not in 
control of their own borders, must not happen again. The migration has 
risen up the agenda since then in much of Western Europe. In Austria, the 
far right has ended power, while the hard-right Alternativ für Deutschland 
is now the biggest opposition party in Germany according to most opinion 
polls.   
 Second, there was a concern that some of the intra-regional conflicts were 
heating up. Recent high profile incidents involving Kosovo and Serbia 
represent a key example of this. 
 Third, there are growing concerns—loudly and regularly expressed in the 
media in Western Europe— about the growing influence of outside powers 
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in the region. This has included (but is not limited to) worries about Russia, 
Turkey and China.  
 Fourth, there is a clear feeling in Brussels that ultimately the Western 
Balkans belongs in the EU. Geographically, the region is surrounded by EU 
member states. This sense of the EU being the Western Balkans’ ultimate 
destination appears to be both stronger and more widespread than in the 
case of, say, Ukraine. The fact that Albania is a NATO member, while not 
directly connected to EU membership, also matters, in further reinforcing 
the region’s tilt towards euro-Atlantic institutions.  
The new Commission strategy notably puts a much bigger focus on taking a 
hands-on approach to solving political conflicts in the region. For two decades, 
the EU strategy for the Western Balkans has been characterized by a focus on 
economic connectivity as a way of driving political conciliation. In short: countries 
that trade with each other and that are well connected will not fight each other, 
and may eventually become friends. In addition, the EU has sought to open its 
markets to the Western Balkan countries to help develop the external sectors of 
the region. Western Balkan countries have enjoyed free trade with the EU since 
2000. Regional trade integration was cemented by the Central European Free 
Trade Agreement (CEFTA) in 2007. The new Commission strategy, by contrast, 
acknowledged that often political tensions are themselves a barrier to greater 
connectivity and trade between countries. 
The new target for accession is highly ambitious, even for Serbia, and probably 
deliberately so. The big question is how realistic the 2025 target date for 
accession is, and where the main barriers are to achieving this.  
At least for some countries in the region, economic development per se is not a 
problem for EU accession. Or put another way, the economic problems of the 
Western Balkans are not necessarily explained by or encapsulated in GDP per 
capita income levels. Particularly in the cases of Serbia, GDP per capita levels as a 
share of the EU average are roughly in line of those with Romania and Bulgaria 
when they joined the EU in 2007. Even as of 2016, data on wage convergence 
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with Austria in PPP terms showed almost all countries in the region at a higher 
level than Bulgaria. 
However, the economic challenges to accession are clearly significant and 
numerous. The most recent Commission progress reports, published in April93, 
refer to various idiosyncratic obstacles to Western Balkans economies on their 
road to EU accession. However, looking across the reports, there are several 
common themes. A lack of competitiveness, big external deficits, high public debt, 
rigid labor markets (according to the Commission linked to high unemployment 
and large-scale outward migration), weak governance, a large informal economy, 
and infrastructure deficiencies appear in most if not all country reports. 
Among these various factors, four things stand out as particularly problematic. 
Tackling and resolving political conflicts (which act as a barrier to economic 
development), infrastructure deficiencies, weak governance and the generally 
small industrial base are particularly pressing issues. This is not the whole story, 
but solving these four issues would provide help to solve the region’s economic 
problems more generally, and improve its ability to meet the criteria for EU 
accession. 
9.1 Solving political conflicts as a first step for economic development 
 
Political conflicts are often a barrier to economic connectivity and development in 
the region. By taking a more active stance in the region, including via the 
“Brussels process”, the Commission could drive political reconciliation that 
delivers important economic benefits as well.  
Admittedly, the Commission approach of the past two decades has produced 
positive results from an economic perspective. Since the EU opened its markets to 
the region in 2000, the overall shares of exports in GDP in the Western Balkans 
have doubled. FYR Macedonia and Serbia in particular have achieved relatively 
high levels even compared with many EU member states. 
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However, efforts to stimulate intra-regional trade have been much less successful. 
While total exports have grown strongly over the past ten years, trade within the 
region has largely been flat over the period, and in almost all cases accounts for a 
fairly low share of the total.  
An important reason for subdued regional trade, especially compared with 
exports outside the region over the past decade, is a shortage of demand. While 
Western Balkan exports to the EU are effectively supply-constrained (the region 
can sell as much as it can produce), those within the region are demand 
constrained. Even by European standards, most of the Western Balkans has had a 
tough post-crisis period. In Serbia, comfortably the region’s biggest economy and 
therefore most important potential source of regional demand, real final 
consumption expenditure in 2016 (last year for which full comparable regional 
data are available) was still below 2008-09 levels.  
However, a lack of demand is clearly not the only issue. Domestic demand in 
Albania has risen quite strongly since 2008, without any discernible impact on 
regional trade patterns. It is clear that political factors, and specifically multiple 
instances of bad bilateral relations between countries in the region (combined 
with related connectivity deficits), have held back intra-regional trade growth. In 
this sense, while we welcome attempts to further facilitate trade via, for example, 
a regional common market (as floated by Johannes Hahn, the European 
Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations), 
we believe breaking the political barriers to higher trade is a greater priority.  
Finally on politics, the Commission believes that intra-regional disputes must be 
solved before countries join the EU. Most importantly here, the Commission has 
stated a legally-binding agreement between Kosovo and Serbia must be signed 
before either joins the EU94. This makes sense, although it is clear that the 
challenges are enormous. Among other things, the legitimacy issues that leaders 
on both sides, will face in pushing through any possible agreement domestically95. 
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Here perhaps more than anywhere else under the new strategy, the involvement 
and role of the Commission, and the EU more generally, will be very important. 
9.3 The challenge of bad governance 
 
The quality of governance and institutions matters a lot for growth, including in 
the CESEE region. Moreover, upgrading governance standards to EU levels are a 
key part of meeting the accession criteria. The governance deficit in the Western 
Balkans is big, even compared with the laggards among current EU member states 
such as Romania and Bulgaria. On average, using the World Bank governance 
indicators, the six Western Balkans countries stand at around two thirds of the 
levels of Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania when they joined the EU.  
Based on current trends, meeting the EU accession criteria by 2025 looks very 
ambitious for even the frontrunners among the Western Balkan countries. A leap 
forward in governance standards is certainly not impossible, but will require a 
more concerted effort at the local level than we currently see. Political 
fragmentation and instability in some countries will make this even more 
challenging (and emphasizes the importance of a more active role for the EU). A 
strong improvement in democratic standards—as partly seen more recently for 
example in FYR Macedonia—could reduce the time needed for reform.  
9.4 Connectivity and infrastructure development 
 
The third major challenge is that the Western Balkans suffers from a major 
infrastructure deficit, which hampers economic development. This is hardly a new 
issue, and can be traced back at least 200 years. The historical division of the 
region between empires contributed to this. The region has long suffered from a 
lack of connectivity and poor infrastructure, in terms both of links within and 
outside of the region. Railways, for example, both arrived much later in the 
Western Balkans than in the rest of Europe, and once they did spread much more 
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slowly96. This played an important role in holding back the economic development 
of the Western Balkans and its lack of convergence with Western Europe income 
levels, a challenge that the region is yet to overcome. This long-term historical 
deficit was then compounded by the wars of the 1990s, and the (linked) delayed 
accession to the EU. This had three important implications for connectivity in the 
region. First, physical infrastructure was destroyed in the wars, including 
infrastructure connecting what would become different countries in the former 
Yugoslavia. It is emblematic that so many bridges were destroyed. This ranges 
from the destruction of the historic Old Bridge in Mostar in Herzegovina to the 
NATO bombing of Serbian bridges across the Danube. Second, even after the wars 
ended, political relationships remained at best strained (if not outright non-
existent), limiting the willingness of countries to develop physical transport 
connections between them.  
 
Third, the wars contributed heavily to the delay in the region joining the EU, 
which has meant the Western Balkan countries missed out a huge amount of 
funds available to their regional peers for infrastructure upgrading. Eight formerly 
Communist countries joined the EU in 2004, and another two in 2007, with 
Croatia arriving in 2013. Over this period, these countries have had access to full 
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EU funds, something that remains largely unavailable to the Western Balkan 
countries. These factors have meant that the region’s existing infrastructure 
deficit has, if anything, grown wider. Infrastructure investment needs in the 
Western Balkans are estimated by the EBRD to be between 8% (Serbia) and 12% 
(Bosnia) of GDP per year over the period 2018-2022, significantly higher than for 
most EU member states. Railway and motorway density in the region remains far 
below that of neighboring EU member states such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, 
Romania and Slovenia. In this context, the Berlin Process is a welcome 
development. Annual meetings with a focus on connectivity mean that the issue 
stays at least on the agenda. According to The Vienna Institute for International 
Economic Studies, announced projects in the Berlin Process, if realized, will add 1 
percentage point per year to GDP in all Western Balkan countries over a 15-year 
time horizon. Moreover, around 200,000 jobs would be created, equivalent to 
around 4% of the region’s workforce.97 Given the low savings rates in the region, 
the funds for a bigger industrial base will have to come from FDI. FDI inflows into 
the Western Balkans relative to their GDP size was actually no lower than EU-CEE 
countries on average. However, this primarily reflects their small size (put 
together in nominal GDP terms they are roughly the size of Slovakia). Most have 
struggled to attract investment into higher value added sectors in the tradable 
sector. Weak governance and infrastructure deficiencies are key barriers to 
attracting a better quality of FDI.98  
To a certain extent, FYR Macedonia shows the way for the rest of the region. 
Along with (to a lesser extent) Serbia, FYR Macedonia has bucked the regional 
trend in developing a relatively big export-oriented manufacturing sector99. 
Merchandise exports were equivalent to 50% of GDP in 2017 in FYR Macedonia, 
and 41% in Serbia. These levels were still far below those in the manufacturing 
powerhouses of central Europe (especially the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary), but otherwise roughly in line with levels seen in the rest of CESEE. 
However, Albania lags significantly behind.  
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Moreover, even in FYR Macedonia, the process is far from complete. My research 
on the Macedonian tradable sector finds that it is not sufficiently diversified and 
internationalized, with a dominance of larger firms, and not appropriately 
innovative. The policy should focus on supporting innovation, easier access to the 
product market in support of entrepreneurship, and support for the 
internationalization of economic activities. Both public policies and the financial 
system should be supportive of these improvements in the product market.  
The four issues described above are not the whole story. However, addressing 
them would go a long way to helping to solve others, notably the lack of 
employment opportunities. Regional labor markets improved last year, but 
remain beset by high unemployment and low activity rates, especially among 
young people according to a major study undertaken by The Vienna Institute for 
International Economic Studies (wiiw) and the World Bank100. Continued large-
scale emigration reflects a lack of opportunities at home.  
A previous wiiw study found that much better employment conditions could be 
achieved via several policy steps 101 . A more widespread use of collective 
bargaining would ensure cooperation between labor and industry in maintaining 
competitiveness. Better quality vocational training and stronger links between 
industry and the education system would also help.102 The region has generally 
been slow to adapt to changing circumstances in the labor market, owing to 
factors including resistance to reform, corruption in the education system, a lack 
of quality control in private institutions, and low incentives for new providers of 
vocational training.103 Even in countries with relatively high levels of enrolment in 
vocational training (such as Serbia), this is not matched by professional skills 
acquisition.104 One caveat here, however, is the point made recently by Ivan 
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Krastev at wiiw’s Spring Seminar that improved education in CESEE simply leads 
to increased outward migration.105 
10. Policy recommendations 
 
After a prolonged and difficult transition path, the WB countries still do not seem 
to be on a development path that would guarantee future socio-economic 
prosperity. Key long-term structural problems of the WB economies – limited 
competitiveness on world markets, “jobless” growth, increasing social problems, 
and extreme deindustrialization – have not been resolved, while growth based on 
excessive credit expansion has come to an end. Although the macroeconomic 
situation has recently improved, GDP growth rates are still subdued in 
comparison to the pre-crisis period, while fiscal and monetary policies have 
limited room of maneuver. Current economic and social problems are a serious 
constraint for future development of the WB economies. Rather than just strive 
for increased economic growth, the WB countries should aim at implementing a 
more balanced model of development that would take into account social, 
economic and ecological aspects. High inequality, unemployment and poverty ask 
for redistributive policies that would combat mounting social problems and 
secure decent living standards. The WB countries should enable its population to 
enjoy decent work and pursue the goal of social inclusion, envisioning a just 
transition to an economy that is also environmentally sustainable.106 
In order to pursue these goals, WB policy-makers need to elaborate and 
implement a more efficient industrial policy. Such industrial policies need to be 
country-specific, carefully prepared in each country on the basis of national 
priorities. Governments need to influence the quality of investment – both 
foreign and domestic – particularly its sectoral distribution. In order to diversify 
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and upgrade the production and export base, policy makers should not wait to 
see what international market forces bring to them; recent findings by Harding 
and Javorcik (2012)107  show that sector targeting by investment promotion 
agencies – not simply opening the host economy to FDI – doubles FDI flows into 
the chosen sectors and results in higher unit-value exports. 108  The WB 
governments also need to device such mechanisms for selecting industries and 
providing packages of public sector support to address coordination externalities, 
overcome imperfections in information markets, while providing investors with 
public goods such as a well-trained labor force. Such an approach is what Moran 
calls “light-form industrial policy” that could harness FDI to development and 
generate backward linkages as deep as possible into the host economy (Moran, 
2014, pp. 32-33). Potential benefits of FDI for the host economy depend amongst 
other things on national infrastructure, market size, systems of education and 
training, institution quality, political stability and control of corruption.109 
Investment promotion policies directed towards potential foreign and domestic 
investors need to be linked to the most important objectives of national economic 
development. After more than eight years of economic crisis and feeble economic 
recovery, it seems risky for the WB governments to merely wait for the return of 
foreign investors and to continue relying on their capabilities to restructure their 
economies. An investment promotion strategy needs to aim at attracting not only 
more, but also better quality, investments that would facilitate faster 
restructuring and technological upgrading of key industries. Such an investment 
policy should also influence the sectoral distribution of domestic and foreign 
investments that should extend across sectors of agriculture, energy, R&D, 
education and innovation. More efficient policies promoting organic farming and 
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those connecting the agricultural sector with food industry should be 
implemented. The WB countries should reduce their dependence on highly 
polluting energy production (coal) and increase their energy sovereignty by 
reverting to renewable energy sources. FDI can be a welcome supplement to the 
still low domestic savings characterizing all WB countries, but it is unlikely to be 
sufficient to secure faster and sustained economic development. As elsewhere, 
FDI is influenced not only by government policies, such as institutional reforms 
and tax incentives, but by exogenous factors such as size, level of development 
and geographical position.110 Economic smallness and fragmentation of the WB 
region implies the lack of economies of scale, which remains a serious handicap of 
these countries.  
One way to overcome this handicap and accelerate WB economic development is 
through more intensive regional cooperation 111.   The current institutional crisis of 
the EU and the related bleak prospects of quick accession of the current 
candidates and potential candidates implies that they ought to devise new 
mechanisms to accelerate economic development in order to prepare for future 
competitive pressure within the EU. Coordinating national policies in some of the 
priority areas in order to implement regional initiatives jointly makes a lot of 
sense for small economies such as the WBs, particularly considering the legacies 
and economic linkages inherited from former Yugoslavia. Although the benefits of 
regional cooperation have been emphasized for long112, its potentials have not 
been sufficiently utilized. More intensive regional cooperation in the area of R&D, 
energy, transport, agriculture or specific industries has the potential of 
accelerating growth in the WBs in the medium term. Industrial policy at the 
regional level through the creation of trans-national networks and supply chains 
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could be mutually beneficial, since multinational companies created by 
enterprises from several WB countries are bound to be more competitive on EU 
markets than small national firms. The SEE 2020 Strategy adopted by the Regional 
Cooperation Council and the ministers of the respective SEE countries in Sarajevo 
in November 2013 is an attempt to implement desired regional cooperation 
initiatives. The Berlin process also represents a step forward in this regard. 
Whereas recently there has been some progress in initiating a Regional Economic 
Area in the WBs113, a lot more could be done in most areas of regional economic 
and political cooperation.  
Regarding the role of the EU, the renewed EU enlargement policy based on three 
pillars – Public administration, Rule of Law and Economic governance – now gives 
major importance to problems of economic development. This is promising, since 
in the past and for too long economic problems were in the shadow of political 
issues. In particular, the new policy instrument recently introduced by the 
European Commission – the Economic Reform Program (ERP) – ought to 
contribute to improvements in WB’s economic governance.114 Mirroring in part 
the European Semester, the new policy instrument, in addition to more efficient 
macroeconomic fiscal and monetary policies, imposes on the WB policy-makers 
the need to adopt a longer (three-year) planning framework, introduce 
prioritization of structural objectives and impact analysis of desired goals. 
However, only a few countries have for now had the administrative capacity to 
actually undertake this type of longer-term policy planning and assessment.115  
Major constraints on the implementation of the desired reforms in the WBs are 
limited financial resources, especially for investment purposes. Even a radical 
reallocation of budgetary funds that would substantially increase public 
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investment and reduce consumption-related expenditure would not be enough to 
provide the necessary resources for investment in those areas that have been 
singled out as crucial for faster economic development of the WBs. The finance 
provided by the EU through the IPA II to the WBs is still rather low and largely 
insufficient to provide for accelerated economic development. The WBs must be 
supported with additional financial resources from the EU and its institutions 
much before they actually fulfill the conditions to enter the EU. Flessenkemper 
and Reljić (2017)116 suggest that the WB accession countries “should be granted 
access to the EU’s structural funds, be permitted to participate in the EU’s 
financial stability mechanisms, and be treated in all other respects as part of the 
European integration project”. Major EU financial support could help the aspirant 
countries to boost their public investment and adopt a clearer developmental 
perspective. This would be beneficial both economically and geo-politically, not 
only for the Balkans but also for the EU itself (Bonomi and Reljić, 2017).117  
    Conclusions 
 
The Western Balkans has witnessed dramatic changes over the past 25 years. 
Financial integration took off somewhat later than in the New Member States, but 
has increased rapidly, despite still much lower capital account openness. Capital 
inflows as a share of GDP are comparable to those observed in the New Member 
States, (perhaps surprisingly) diverse in terms of source countries and in both 
regions FDI and bank lending account for the bulk of inflows as well as outflows 
(though the latter are still small in the Western Balkans), while shares of equity 
assets in total external assets are much higher than they were in the New 
Member States at comparable levels of development.   
                                                          
116 Flessenkemper, T. and D. Reljić (2017), “EU Enlargement: A Six Percent Target for the Western Balkans”, 
available at https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/point-of-view/eu-enlargement-a-six-percent-target-for-the-western-
balkans/. 
117 Bonomi, M. and D. Reljić (2017), “Boosting growth in the Western Balkans to accelerate convergence 
with the EU”, forthcoming. 
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Similar to the experience of the New Member States, the region experienced 
booming inflows in 2003–07, driven by a combination of push and pull factors: a 
willing supply of funds from Western Europe and expectations of high growth in 
Emerging Europe. Booming inflows provided financing and supported private 
sector development and employment, however their sharp drop as a result of the 
global financial crisis and strong link with growth point to vulnerabilities. So far 
inflows have held up better than in the New Member States, however the 
similarities in terms of their determinants point to caution: capital inflows are 
pro-cyclical, thus potentially raising vulnerabilities by amplifying external shocks. 
The challenges facing the region on the road to accession are numerous. I believe 
that four are particularly pressing: resolving political disputes within the region, 
improving governance standards, upgrading infrastructure, and expanding the 
industrial base. Solving these in a comprehensive and timely manner will go a long 
way to helping countries in the region to meet their accession goals. 
The Western Balkan countries will be able to join the European Union once the 
criteria of Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, including the Copenhagen 
criteria, are met. While none meets these criteria today, the region has come a 
long way since the end of the 1990s.  
Overall, significant progress has been made both on reforms and on overcoming 
the devastating legacy of war and conflict. But in order for the countries to meet 
all membership conditions and strengthen their democracies, comprehensive and 
convincing reforms are still required in crucial areas, notably on the rule of law, 
competitiveness, and regional cooperation and reconciliation.  
First, the rule of law must be strengthened significantly. Today, the countries 
show clear elements of state capture, including links with organised crime and 
corruption at all levels of government and administration, as well as a strong 
entanglement of public and private interests. All this feeds a sentiment of 
impunity and inequality. There is also extensive political interference in and 
control of the media. A visibly empowered and independent judiciary and 
accountable governments and administrations are essential for bringing about the 
lasting societal change that is needed.  
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Second, critical parts of the region's economies are uncompetitive, with too much 
undue political interference and an underdeveloped private sector. None of the 
Western Balkans can currently be considered a functioning market economy nor 
to have the capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces in 
the union. In spite of all progress on reforms, many structural issues remain, 
which in turn affect labour markets and notably employment opportunities for 
younger people.  
Third, there are still important bilateral disputes between countries in the region 
which remain to be solved. The EU will not accept to import these disputes and 
the instability they could entail. Definitive and binding solutions must be found 
and implemented before a country accedes. Last but not least, joining the EU is a 
choice. It needs political and societal consensus and the support of the hearts and 
minds of the people. There can be no ambiguity by leaders about where the 
Western Balkans belong and the direction in which they are heading. This is 
necessary to secure and sustain the support of their own and of EU citizens, and 
must be reflected in leaders’ communications and outreach to citizens.  
The respective European paths of the Western Balkan countries are flanked by 
various initiatives, such as the Berlin Process, 3 sectoral platforms such as the 
Energy and Transport Communities, and regional actors, such as the Regional 
Cooperation Council. It is now up to the countries' authorities, with the support of 
their societies, to take ownership and deliver on the well-known conditions for 
accession. To make the ambitious best-case scenario a reality, action must be 
taken now. Ultimately, the region's citizens will judge their own governments on 
whether or not they are willing and able to deliver on their European ambitions. 
Efforts should be intensified to guide rule of law-related reforms in the region, to 
support the ambitious steps to be taken by the countries themselves. The tools 
developed during the negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia under the rule of 
law chapters should also be used in other Western Balkan countries as a stimulus 
for early adoption of key reforms. This will include analysis of legislation and 
practice in this field, leading to the establishment of detailed action plans 
prioritising key issues, and close monitoring of implementation and delivery of 
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concrete results. There is great benefit in increased Member States' and experts' 
contributions to support and bring pressure to bear on reform implementation. 
More detailed rule of law assessments should be undertaken and advisory 
missions extended to the whole Western Balkans, building on the experience of 
the earlier advisory missions. Monitoring of implementation and enforcement 
should be enhanced including through more systematic, case-based peer-reviews 
organised by the Commission with the participation of Member State experts. 
Trial monitoring in the field of serious corruption and organised crime should be 
introduced. Work developing indicators of reform implementation should be 
undertaken. Progress in judicial reform needs to be measured by the 
effectiveness of justice that the system is able to provide to its citizens and 
businesses. The negotiating framework for Serbia place particular emphasis on 
the need for rule of law reforms to be addressed early in the negotiations. The 
Commission recommends that greater use is made of the leverage provided in the 
negotiating frameworks. Accordingly, a substantial improvement should be 
required on the rule of law and in particular concrete results in judicial reform and 
in the fight against corruption and organised crime before technical talks on other 
chapters of the accession negotiations can be provisionally closed. 
An investment in the Western Balkans is an investment in Europe. Investments 
will only increase if economic governance is strengthened and structural reforms 
pursued to increase competitiveness. The measures below serve to support this 
goal and to enhance growth and job creation in particular for the region's youth. 
The Western Balkans Investment Framework financed through the Instrument for 
pre-Accession Assistance will be increasingly at the core of fostering investments 
in the region. To that effect, it will be expanded to further attract and coordinate 
bilateral donors’ and International Financing Institutions’ investment. Increased 
funding in the fields of transport, energy, the social sector, the environment, and 
private sector development, including the digital economy is foreseen. To link 
socio-economic development in the region to the Union's investment priorities, 
the Commission aims to significantly boost the provision of guarantees under the 
Western Balkans Investment Framework to crowd in private investment in the 
region, in full complementarity with existing initiatives. With a view to the next 
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Multi-annual Financial Framework, the Western Balkans should also be 
adequately covered in possible future external lending arrangements. The 
Regional Economic Area is an essential step for furthering economic integration 
between the EU and the Western Balkans and boosting the attractiveness of the 
regional market. The Commission will continue supporting the development of 
intraregional economic integration, including by mobilising its expertise to assist 
with the implementation of Regional Economic Area action plan, in particular in 
areas covered by the EU acquis. While trade between the EU and the Western 
Balkans was over EUR 43 billion in 2016, there is significant further growth 
potential. To realise this potential, the Commission will further facilitate EU-
Western Balkans trade. This will include developing mutual recognition 
programmes on the basis of Central European Free Trade Area and Regional 
Economic Area (e.g. Authorised Economic Operators). Membership of the World 
Trade Organisation is a prerequisite for EU accession and can spur economic 
growth and foster significant investment for the region. The Commission will 
continue assisting Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia in their World Trade 
Organisation accession process. The development of a robust private sector led 
by entrepreneurs both from within the region and from the EU will better harness 
the dynamism of the region’s youth and foster mutually beneficial economic 
integration. Links between the diaspora business community in the EU and 
entrepreneurs in the EU and the Western Balkans will continue to be encouraged, 
including through the EU programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Measures are needed to increase access to 
finance and harness the growth potential of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
In order to boost entrepreneurship and innovation, the Commission will roll out a 
scheme supporting technology transfer and start-ups across the region and 
support efforts aimed at smart specialisation as well as the circular economy. The 
EU's Framework Programmes are already open to the Western Balkans. To ensure 
their more effective participation, further integration into the existing knowledge 
networks in the EU should be foreseen, including research and innovation 
capacity building. Collaboration can be further developed under other initiatives, 
including EU macroregional strategies. The Commission will work on supporting 
the professionalism and independence of public procurement officials and on 
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strengthening oversight mechanisms to enable monitoring of the full tender cycle. 
For these efforts to be efficient, a firm political commitment is needed to address 
corruption. The annual economic reform programme exercise led by the 
Commission with all Western Balkan countries is a crucial tool for supporting the 
modernisation of their economies and achieving closer economic coordination 
with the EU. The Commission will strengthen this exercise, bring it even closer in 
line with the existing European semester for EU Member States and provide more 
advanced technical assistance. The European Pillar of Social Rights reflects 
principles and rights that are essential for fair and well-functioning labour 
markets and welfare systems. Through a new reinforced social dimension for the 
Western Balkans, the Commission will work to support employment and social 
policy in the region, encouraging appropriate engagement from all levels of 
government, social partners and civil society. This will include an increased focus 
on employment and social reforms through greater monitoring of relevant 
policies, including in the context of the economic reform programmes. The 
Commission proposes an annual EU-Western Balkans Ministerial meeting on 
social and employment issues to exchange views. More financial assistance 
should be foreseen in the social sector, notably investment in education and 
health to support social inclusion. Enhanced support should be provided to 
education, in particular vocational education and training and skills as well 
teacher training and pre-school education Funding under the Erasmus+ 
programme will be doubled to help even more young citizens of the Western 
Balkans to study and gain experience in the EU thereby furthering economic 
development and promoting common values. A pilot mobility scheme for learners 
and trainers in vocational education and training will be established in close 
cooperation with stakeholders including the European Training Foundation. 
 
Enhancing connectivity within the Western Balkans represents a strategic 
interest for both sides. Increasing transport and energy connections will allow for 
increased competitiveness, economic growth and security of supply, and is at the 
same time an important prerequisite for economic integration within the Western 
Balkans. The Energy Community Treaty and the Transport Community Treaty as 
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well as the European Common Aviation Area provide for advanced regulatory 
frameworks that can – combined with strong political cooperation in the region – 
largely facilitate intra-regional connectivity. The Western Balkans are surrounded 
geographically by EU Member States and it is a political priority to connect 
infrastructure also between the EU and the Western Balkans and to accelerate 
the development of interconnected trans-European networks in the fields of 
transport, energy and digital services. Investment in infrastructure networks 
brings tangible benefits clearly recognised by citizens and business in the EU and 
Western Balkans alike. In addition to increased funding of these networks and the 
creation of a new guarantee scheme for private investment, the Commission will 
work to ensure more effective use of existing provisions of the Connecting Europe 
Facility for the Western Balkans countries. The Commission will explore 
possibilities for 14 simplifying their participation in the next Multi-annual 
Financial Framework. An energy union with the Western Balkans: To strengthen 
the EU's Energy Union, all of its dimensions should be expanded to the Western 
Balkans: supporting energy security, market integration and energy transition, 
including energy efficiency and renewable energies. In this context, each country 
should complete all necessary reforms and streamline their policies fully in line 
with the five pillars of the Energy Union. Capacity building of energy regulators 
and transmission system operators in the Western Balkans should be supported 
so that they can participate fully in EU-level networks. Work to complete the 
Regional Electricity Market in the Western Balkans should be pursued and its 
integration into the EU Internal Electricity Market assured. Towards a true 
transport union with the Western Balkans: Implementation of the Transport 
Community Treaty which entered into force in 2017 will be the key step leading to 
progressive integration of the region into the EU transport market. Agreements 
on priority transport corridors between the EU and the Western Balkans as part of 
the trans-European transport network are already in place. These now need to be 
made a reality to ensure their contribution to increasing the competitiveness of 
the continent as a whole.  
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